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A Theory of Expressive 
International Law 
Alex Geisinger 
Michael Ashley Stein 60 Vand. L. Rev. 77 (2007) 
Ever since Grotius first suggested that desire for esteem from 
the broader global community motivates States to comply with 
international law, identifying just how this desire effects compliance 
has proven illusive. The ability to harness the pull of international 
society is important to virtually all treaty formation and compliance. 
It is especially important in the area of human rights regimes where 
other compliance forces such as coercion, are rarely, if ever, used. 
Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that human 
rights regimes are ineffective. Indeed, in many situations this 
evidence suggests that the human rights practices of States that 
ratify such treaties may actually worsen after ratification. The need 
to understand how, or whether, the pull of international society 
influences state behavior, thus, has never been greater. 
This Article provides an initial detailed model of the forces 
motivating human rights treaty creation and compliance by drawing 
on evolving expressive law literature. It begins by setting forth a 
need-reinforcement model that explains how normative pressure 
influences rational actors to alter their behavior and beliefs while 
seeking regard from other group members. Next, the Article applies 
this model to State treaty ratification and compliance, and describes 
how treaties exert expressive effects that lead rational States to 
change their behavior because of their desire to be part of and 
esteemed by the global community. The Article then demonstrates 
how this expressive theory harmonizes the contributions of divergent 
international law scholars into a more complete theory of why States 
enter into and obey international law. In doing so, it provides a 
framework from which regime design implications can be drawn. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What is the "pull of international society'' and how does it 
influence the willingness of States to enter into or comply with 
international law? Since Grotius first identified the concept that 
States seek esteem from the broader global community, 1 its 
parameters have proven illusive.2 Nonetheless, the notion remains 
central to discussions of why States comply with international 
agreements.3 
Understanding the reputational mechanism that impels State 
compliance is especially important to human rights treaties. Unlike 
other regimes, States that ratify and abide by the terms of these 
instruments receive neither reciprocal nor immediate benefits. 4 
* Professor and Associate Dean, Valparaiso University School of Law; Professor, Drexel 
University College of Law. 
** Cabell Research Professor, William and Mary School of Law. This Article was written 
while Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School (2005·06). We thank Kenneth Dau·Schmidt, 
Andrew Guzman, Eric Posner, Jeremy Telman, Stepan Wood and participants at a faculty 
workshop at the University of Connecticut School of Law for their comments; Yvonne Chan and 
Laura Colleton for their research assistance; and Penelope Stein and Jane Scarpellino for their 
support. 
1. See generally HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (A. C. Campbell, trans., 
reprint ed., M. Walter Dunne 1979) (1625); see also ABRAM CHAYES & ANOTINA HANDLER 
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 
27-28 (1995) (arguing that compliance derives from the need to maintain one's status within a 
highly interrelated community of States). 
2- See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Internalization Through Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975, 
977 (2005) (referencing Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks as stating that "the mechanisms of 
social influence have so far been grossly underspecified in the literature") [hereinafter Koh, 
Internalization]. 
3. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 
2599, 2646 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations] (explaining that international norm 
internalization occurs when a transnational actor provokes an interaction with another actor, 
forcing an interpretation of the applicable global norm in order to coerce the other party to 
internalize the new interpretation of the norm); see also George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, 
Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 95 (2002) ("International 
relations theorists and international lawyers have argued that reputational concerns help ensure 
that states maintain their agreements."); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of 
International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1825, 1835-36 (2002) (arguing that nations internalize norms 
to participate in the transnational legal process). 
4. This is because human rights treaties control state conduct towards their own citizens. 
See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1823 (2003) 
(stating that parties to human rights treaties "receive only promises from other nations to 
refrain from harming their own citizens"). One could argue that positive network externalities, 
even to the extent of financial advantage, can be generated by human rights treaty collaboration. 
Such an assertion would be in line with our theory that improved reputation effects motivate 
international cooperation_ That impact, however, is not immediate since it requires time to 
accrete. To the extent that monetary advantage is immediate, for example one state reworking 
its trade relationship with another in return for the latter ratifying a given treaty, that influence 
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Consequently, the desire for international esteem is the crucible by 
which compliance with human rights norms is determined. Professor 
Oona Hathaway has recently raised concerns about the efficacy of the 
reputational mechanism through an empirical study suggesting that 
ratification of human rights treaties may lead to increased human 
rights violations. 5 While these findings have been challenged on both 
econometric and normative grounds,6 the need to understand whether 
Hathaway's findings are simply the result of faulty measurement, 
improper regime design, or the inability of social forces to compel 
compliance is crucial to the development and success of the 
international human rights project. Answers to these questions begin 
with the development of more detailed models of the way social forces 
work. Not only will such models enable us to determine if social forces 
can be harnessed to better ensure compliance with human rights 
treaties, they also provide a framework that can help us better design 
human rights instruments. 
A number of scholars have begun to explore the social 
mechanism. Professors Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, for example, 
suggest that the social force is one of acculturation-a process 
whereby actors adopt the beliefs of the surrounding culture-and that 
this force stands apart from traditional notions of coercion and 
is coercive. A more complete account of the difference between persuasion, reputation, and 
coercion is set forth infra Part Ill. B. 
5. Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International 
Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 526 (2005) [hereinafter Hathaway, Between Power and Principle]; 
Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1989 
(2002) [hereinafter Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties]. 
6. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 
EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 171, 173 (2003) [hereinafter Goodman & Jinks, Measuring the Effects]. The 
essence of their critique is one of timing: human rights obligations inure on State signature and 
incorporation rather than on ratification. Hence, examining the period preceding implementing 
domestic legislation-when States are likely to be in technical violation when measured against 
ratification but not against incorporation-may skew the results. They also assert that 
Hathaway does not properly account for reservations under which States can delay 
implementing treaty obligations. For an empirical examination of how this type of timing 
differential affects perspectives regarding human rights compliance, see Linda Camp Keith, The 
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make a Difference in 
Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95, 105 (1999) ("A separate analysis was conducted 
in which the states that derogated from the treaty were moved into the group of non-party 
states .... When this adjustment is made, the difference between states parties and non-party 
states personal integrity abuse increases substantially."). See also Ryan Goodman & Derek 
Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE 
L.J. 621, 700 (2004) [hereinafter Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States] (advocating the 
development of an empirical approach that would integrate the mechanisms of coercion, 
persuasion and acculturation to build an effective human rights regime); Ryan Goodman & 
Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1785 (2003) 
(arguing that universal ratification should be the first goal of treaty regimes, while achieving 
enforcement should come later). 
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persuasion. 7 Other commentators aver that States ratify or comply as 
a way of signaling their cooperative nature to others.8 Dean Harold 
Koh suggests that a complex interaction of domestic and international 
processes leads to the internalization of international norms by a 
State.9 Another school of thought, championed by Dean Anne Marie 
Slaughter, suggests that norms are more likely to be enforced by 
liberal States than by States that do not respect the rule of law.l0 By 
contrast, Professors Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner are skeptical of 
social influences. They maintain that international norms are, at best, 
artifacts of the cooperation of States with stable and preexisting 
preferences. 11 
Each of these observations provides an interesting and 
valuable lens through which to VIew the long-recognized but 
misunderstood process of how desire for international esteem 
influences compliance. However, none provides a comprehensive 
framework from which specific conclusions can be drawn. Goodman 
7. Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra note 6, at 626-27; Goodman & Jinks, 
Measuring the Effects, supra note 6, at 183 (suggesting that a sociological empiricism might be 
more helpful than Hathaway's economic approach); see also Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, 
International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges, 54 
DUKE L.J. 983, 991 (2004) [hereinafter Goodman & Jinks, International Law] (asserting that 
states are influenced by acculturation); see also Jose E. Alvarez, Do States Socialize?, 54 DUKE 
L.J. 961, 962 (2004) (arguing that Brian Simpson's work on the European Convention of Human 
Rights would provide a valuable case study to support Goodman & Jinks' acculturation theory); 
Koh, Internalization, supra note 2, at 980 (suggesting that Goodman & Jinks' acculturation 
theory is an "intermediate way between persuasion and coercion"). 
8. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 88 (2002) (quoting 
Beth Simmons as arguing that governments comply with their legal commitments in order to 
preserve their reputations); David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 
97 Nw. U. L. REV. 879, 904 (2003) (suggesting that failing to ratify a treaty indicates antagonism 
towards other participants); Charles K. Whitehead, What's Your Sign?-International Norms, 
Signals, and Compliance, 27 Mich. J. Int'l L. 695 (2006). See also, Andrew T. Guzman, The 
Promise of International Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 533, 549 (2006) (asserting that states that comply 
with legal rules develop reputations as cooperative actors). 
9. "(T)ransnational legal process is normative, dynamic, and constitutive . . . future 
transactions will further internalize those norms; and eventually, repeated participation in the 
process will help to reconstitute the interests and even the identities of the participants in the 
process." Koh, Why Do Nations, supra note 3, at 2646; see also Koh, Internalization, supra note 2, 
at 981 (asserting that a State's norm-internalization could be tracked "from coercion to 
persuasion to internal acceptance"); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. 
REV. 181, 204 (1996) (arguing that the combination of interaction between States and 
internalization of norms through domestic decision-making is what causes international law to 
stick). 
10. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 15 (2004) (arguing that the world order 
is composed of "an intricate three-dimensional web of links between disaggregated state 
institutions"). 
11. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-10, 13 
(2005); Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A 
Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 119 (2002) (arguing that States use 
international legal and moral rhetoric while pursuing their own interests). 
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and Jinks, for instance, identify a number of different processes by 
which acculturation occurs but cannot identify what process will affect 
State behavior in any particular situation. 12 In arguing that 
internalization is the key to compliance, Koh also provides little more 
than descriptive guidance of how such a process works, relying instead 
on the above-stated claim that internalization results from a complex 
and dynamic interaction of States. 13 Signaling theory similarly 
provides scant direction for effective regime design and 
implementation. 14 Likewise, liberal theorists cannot provide a full 
understanding of why democratic States are more compliant than 
others. 15 The result is an important body of work that recognizes the 
centrality and implications of esteem-based mechanisms on 
compliance, but fails to provide a level of detail necessary to 
understand or predict how the desire for esteem affects State 
behavior. 
This Article provides a more complete understanding of the 
forces behind treaty creation and compliance by drawing on the 
developing domestic expressive law literature. By expressive law, we 
mean the impact that law and legal process have on individual 
behavior (construed heuristically as personal or State behavior) by 
affecting the social, or normative, meaning of that behavior. 16 We 
12. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, International Law, supra note 7, at 984 (agreeing with 
criticisms of their theory of acculturation by Koh and Alvarez that "more fine-grained empirical 
work is required to document the specific causal pathways by which law influences States"). 
13. Eric A. Posner, International Law and the Disaggregated State, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
797, 800-01 (2005) (arguing that constructivist scholars such as Harold Koh and Anne-Marie 
Slaughter rely heavily on the notion of internalization but have not yet developed a coherent 
theory of how internalization happens). 
14. In particular, existing descriptions of signaling fail to describe how nations agree on 
which behaviors become signals. For a fuller discussion, see infra Part Ill.D. 
15. See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Why Comply, or Some Hypotheses in Search of an Analyst, in 
INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 21, 36-39 (Edith Brown Weiss, ed., 
1997) (positing an intuitionalist theory that wealthier liberal states are more likely to comply 
with international law than their poorer peers without explaining why this is so); Daniel E. Ho, 
Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Countries Implement the Basle Accord?, 5 J. 
INT'L ECON. L. 647, 682 (2002) (challenging liberal theorists on normative grounds, while also 
demonstrating the absence of empirically verifiable evidence); Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503, 535 (1995) (theorizing that 
aggregation of preferences among influential domestic actors influences liberal democracies to 
comply to a greater extent than others). 
16. Throughout the Article we follow the prevailing convention of referring to States as 
individuals when analyzing actions that usually result from aggregate decision-making. For a 
fuller account, see Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra note 6, at 646 ("There is 
good reason to question whether states" are influenced by social forces. "After all, much of the 
research suggesting the presence of this mechanism centers on the cognitive processes of 
individuals .... Substantial evidence strongly suggests, on both counts, that they do."); see also 
William Bradford, International Legal Compliance: An Annotated Bibliography 4 (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with authors) (identifying a body of scholarship that regards the State as an 
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model the effects of international lawmaking on the beliefs of States 
and ultimately analyze how changing normative belief can influence 
the expected utility of decisions to ratify and/or comply with 
international law. Along the way, we also demonstrate how our model 
clarifies a number of debated issues within the developing compliance 
literatureP 
We draw a number of conclusions relevant to the structure of 
treaty regimes from our analysis and provide a model of how 
expressive influences can best be harnessed to serve the goals of 
ratification and compliance. In general, commentators have 
considered the influences motivating compliance too narrowly by 
concentrating on the relationships surrounding the decision of 
whether to ratify or obey a given individual treaty. Rather than being 
atomistic, the pull of international society is animated by a need-
reinforcement notion that is contingent on a larger system of global 
cooperation. Absent these broader socializing mechanisms, the ability 
to harness norms to achieve treaty compliance will be minimal. 
Finally, we describe how treaty formation may affect the willingness 
of rebel States to act in contravention of international norms, thus 
lessening the ability of a treaty regime to achieve its ultimate goals. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I sets forth our expressive 
theory of international law. Beginning from a standard law and 
economics baseline that assumes individuals act rationally to 
maximize their own utility, we apply expressive law principles to 
explain how normative pressure influences rational actors to alter 
their behavior and beliefs while seeking esteem from other group 
members. We call this the expressive model. Part II applies this 
framework to State international treaty ratification and compliance. It 
describes how international law may affect States' estimates of the 
likelihood of being sanctioned by other States and may also affect 
preferences regarding the behaviors being regulated. Part II also 
considers how international law may affect domestic lawmaking, as 
well as the market behavior of citizens in a country that ratifies a 
particular treaty. Ultimately, we describe how normative forces may 
indeed produce greater compliance in liberal States. Part III returns 
abstraction without the capacity to exercise choice between alternatives and thus treats 
questions of compliance as one of human agency). Because this convention does not adequately 
account for the varied roles that individuals play in reaching group-based decisions, for instance 
the weight given by a State to the opinions of experts or epistemic communities, we will return to 
these more nuanced effects where appropriate. 
17. For our previous, respective, ventures into expressive law scholarship, see Alex 
Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35 (2002); Michael Ashley 
Stein, Under the Empirical Radar: An Initial Expressive Law Analysis of the ADA, 90 VA. L. REV. 
1151 (2004). 
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to the international law literature and demonstrates how an 
expressive theory harmonizes the various schools of thought into a 
more comprehensive view of international law ratification and 
compliance. The Article concludes by providing an example of the way 
in which enforcing our theory would affect monitoring devices m an 
evolving United Nations human rights treaty. 
I. EXPRESSIVE THEORY 
Expressive law examines law's potential for changing the social 
meaning of particular behavior by altering the social cost of 
undertaking that behavior. The decision to act is based on a rational 
assessment of the consequences of the behavior and the certainty of 
belief.l8 In the context of international law and process, the need-
reinforcement principle adds to the basic rational choice model of 
behavior by providing a basis for understanding and modeling how the 
desire for esteem influences a State's assessment of the utility of 
entering into and abiding by any particular legal regime. 
A. The Reasoned-Action Model 
Traditional law and economics literature operates from the 
premise that people act rationally to maximize their own utility when 
choosing among alternatively available courses of conduct. 19 Under 
this framework, known as rational choice theory, law operates by 
varying the cost to an individual of satisfying her preferences through 
the use of exogenous sanctions.2° For any given opportunity, 
increasing the associated cost will decrease that individual's desire to 
choose that opportunity; conversely, a decrease in cost will encourage 
18. See generally Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 586 
(1998) (arguing that rational people will internalize a norm if that action will create a benefit for 
them); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1001 (1995) 
[hereinafter, Lessig, The Regulation] (discussing how "[s]ocial meanings are part of the benefits 
and costs associated with any individual action"); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of 
Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2000) (explaining that when individuals have an 
interest in coordination, law can guide behavior by "influencing expectations" of how others will 
act); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2025 (1996) 
(advocating that "an expressive approach to law depends on an assessment of social 
consequences"). 
19. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 99-
103 (8th ed. 2000) (explaining that a person will choose to make a purchase based on the utility 
the person will gain from the purchase); see also MARK PERLMAN & CHARLES R. MCCANN JR., 
THE PILLARS OF ECONOMIC UNDERSTANDING: FACTORS AND MARKETS 301 (2000) (describing the 
market as a "model of allocative efficiency"). 
20. "In the vision of law that dominates economics-influenced legal theory, law imposes 
sanctions to solve problems." McAdams, supra note 18, at 1650. McAdams uses this axiom as a 
departure point for his version of expressive law theory. 
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the individual to satisfy her desire by choosing that opportunity.21 In 
other words, manipulating the opportunity set available to a given 
actor will alter her subsequent choices. This standard economic 
account has proved a useful baseline method for modeling human 
behavior and thereby predicting the effects of particular policies. 22 
Expressive law seeks to understand law's potential for 
changing the social meaning of particular behavior and thereby to 
alter the social cost of undertaking that behavior.23 Some authors 
consider the social, or symbolic, meaning of certain legal doctrines or 
decisions; others consider the impact that law may have on mediating 
the social meaning of an activity.24 What is crucial to this analysis is 
the nexus between law, norms, and social meaning. When designed 
appropriately, law can cause individuals to alter their own behavior 
because it either induces them to change their tastes (internalization), 
or it creates a fear of bearing social sanctions (second order 
sanctions). 25 
Our expressive theory of international law is based on the 
Reasoned-Action model of decision-making, which identifies two 
factors that affect an individual's decision to undertake a behavior.26 
The first factor is the individual's attitude toward the behavior itself. 
The second factor is the individual's beliefs about what other people 
think of the behavior. The Reasoned-Action model is diagrammed in 
Figure 1.27 
21. For a discussion of this point made in the context of criminal activity, see Kenneth G. 
Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 1, 2-3, 5. 
22. Two Nobel laureates defend this model from the perspective that preferences are 
relatively static and that studying variable taste is a futile endeavor. See George J. Stigler & 
Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76, 76 (1977). 
23. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 18, at 585-88 (describing the role oflaw in the development 
of social norms, and socioeconomic law and economics, which seeks to inject psychological and 
social factors related to wealth and race into otherwise "neutral" economic analyses); Lessig, The 
Regulation, supra note 18, at 946-48 (examining the social construction of orthodoxy and its 
place in the law); McAdams, supra note 18, at 1650-51 (suggesting that law may be alternatively 
conceptualized for its expressive functions, as well as its traditionally acknowledged enforcement 
functions); Sunstein, supra note 18, at 2024-25 (considering how legal statements might be 
designed to change social norms). 
24. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 681-83 (1998). 
25. Tbe above account is synthesized and abbreviated. For a review of the development of 
the field and the nuances contained therein, see Geisinger, supra note 17, at 44-55. 
26. MARTIN FISHBEIN & lCEK AJZEN, BELIEF, ATTITUDE, INTENTION AND BEHAVIOR: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND RESEARCH 13-18 (1975). 
27. Fo~ additional sources of support for the reasoned action model, see leek Ajzen & 
Martin Fishbein, Attitudinal and Normative Variables as Predictors of Specific Behavior, 27 J. 
PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 41, 42 (1973) (describing a theory that predicts behavior using 
both an "attitudinal" and a "normative" factor); leek Ajzen & Martin Fishbein, The Prediction of 
Behavior from Attitudinal and Normative Variables, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 466, 466-
67 (1970) (reporting the results of an experiment analyzing how one's intent to act can be 
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As the model suggests, an individual decides whether to engage 
in particular behaviors by reasoning about how (a) good or bad, and (b) 
likely or unlikely, the outcomes associated with a given behavior will 
be (the "behavioral attitude"). An individual will also consider the 
amount and quality of social pressure to engage or not engage in that 
specific behavior (the "subjective norm"). The behavioral attitude and 
subjective norm together determine the individual's intent to act. 28 
Thus, understanding one's attitude toward a behavior and one's belief 
predicted by one's attitude and normative beliefs). For a recent overview of research in this area, 
see leek Ajzen, The Nature and Operation of Attitudes, 52 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 27, 28 (2001) 
(reviewing research published between 1996 and 1999). Figure 1 is derived from RUSSELL 
VEITCH & DANIEL ARKKELIN, ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVE 109 (1995). 
28. See VEITCH & ARKKELIN, supra note 27, at 108-11 (explaining the theory and relating it 
to environmental perception). One interesting aspect of the model is that it helps us understand 
when attitude and behavior are inconsistent; that is, when one is predisposed positively toward a 
behavior but still does not undertake the behavior due to subjective expectations regarding social 
pressure. 
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about the subjective norm can help to determine29 one's desire to 
undertake that behavior.3o 
B. Beliefs as the Building Blocks of Attitude 
While the subjective norm is defined in terms of one's beliefs 
about what others think of a behavior, it is more difficult to conceive of 
the concept of attitude in terms of an individual's beliefs.31 Attitude 
toward a behavior can, however, be defined as a function of what 
individuals believe about the consequences of the behavior,32 the 
certainty of their beliefs, and their evaluations (either positive or 
negative)33 of those consequences.34 This relationship can be expressed 
29. The model itself can be deceptively simple. ln particular, the model conceives of the 
individual in a vacuum, uninfluenced by social context. Intentions to act, of course, rely 
significantly on social context. For example, an individual may have different attitudes toward 
an activity based on the normative group to which she belongs. Criminals, for example, think 
differently about crime than police and an individual may have a different attitude toward 
pollution as a member of her business community than she does as a member of her home or 
family community. For a general analysis of the influence of social context on norms, see 
ATTITUDES, BEHAVIOR, AND SOCIAL CONTEXT: THE ROLE OF NORMS AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP 2 
(Deborah J. Terry & Michael A. Hogg eds., 2000). 
30. Note that intending to undertake a behavior and actually acting are not always the 
same. There may be physical limitations to behavior. Thus, I may desire to climb a mountain but 
weather, geography or physical exhaustion may keep me from so doing. See generally Lessig, The 
Regulation, supra note 18, at 955-57 (noting that physical limitations may keep us from doing 
what we want). 
31. See VEITCH & ARKKELIN, supra note 27, at 109. We will discuss in much greater detail 
the subjective norm infra Parts Il.B.1·2. 
32. One potentially significant limitation on the effective use of a belief-based theory is the 
fact that any behavior is associated with a virtually limitless number of beliefs, thus significantly 
limiting the ability to analyze the effect law will have on attitude. However, only a relatively 
small number of beliefs affect our attitude. Due to limited attention span, apprehension, and 
information processing abilities, individuals can only process a small number of beliefs at any 
single time. Thus, although an individual may have a large number of beliefs that, if given time, 
she could recall about a particular behavior and its consequences, only a maximum of between 
five and nine of these beliefs underlie her attitude. FISHBEIN & .AJZEN, supra note 26, at 218. 
33. Evaluation of a consequence means simply that one thinks positively or negatively 
about the consequence of an action. Consider one's attitude toward wearing a seatbelt. Certain 
consequences are generally positively evaluated (e.g. safety), while certain other consequences 
are generally negatively evaluated (e.g. discomfort). Evaluations of consequences are formed by 
standard processes of conditioning. See, e.g., id. at 277 (noting that evaluations, in the end, must 
be accounted for by the process of conditioning). These processes include operant conditioning, 
classical conditioning, and vicarious conditioning. See VEITCH & ARKKELIN, supra note 27, at 
105-07 (defining and providing examples of types of conditioning). 
34. The elements of the belief-based theory are as follows: 
(1) An individual holds many beliefs about a given object; i.e., the object may 
be seen as related to various attributes, such as other objects, characteristics, 
goals, etc. (2) Associated with each of the attributes is an implicit evaluative 
response, i.e., an attitude. (3) Through conditioning, the evaluative responses 
are associated with the attitude object. (4) The conditioned evaluative 
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by the equation Ao =I biei where A is the attitude toward behavior 0; b 
is the belief about 0; (i.e. the subjective certainty that 0 will result in 
consequence i); e is the evaluation of the consequence; and n is the 
number of beliefs. 
This theory of beliefs as the basis of attitude can be correlated 
with the Subjective Expected Utility theory of behavioral science. 
According to this concept, "[W]hen a person has to make a behavioral 
choice, he will select that alternative which has the highest subjective 
expected utility," i.e., the alternative which is likely to lead to the most 
favorable outcomes. This can be stated as SEU=I SPiUi where "SP; is 
the subjective probability that the choice of this alternative will lead 
to some outcome i, and U; is the utility of the outcome i." This model 
can be recast in terms of beliefs about consequences. That is, SP=b 
and U=e, or Ao =I biei .. 35 
Take, as an example, a State's attitude toward administrative 
detention, a procedure whereby individuals are held without being 
charged or tried with criminal violations.36 States may evaluate the 
responses summate, and thus (5) on future occasions the attitude object will 
elicit this summated evaluative response, i.e., the overall attitude. 
FISHBEIN & AJZEN, supra note 26, at 29. The theory of belief-based attitude and intent has its 
roots in the earliest work of Professor Fishbein. See, e.g., Martin Fishbein, An Investigation of the 
Relationships Between Beliefs About an Object and the Attitude Toward That Object, 16 HUM. 
REL. 233, 234 (1963) (positing that all beliefs about an object are related to an individual's 
attitude, since all beliefs about an object contain an evaluative aspect). For a description of the 
belief-based theory of attitude and intent formation, this Article will rely primarily on FISHBEIN 
& AJZEN, supra note 26, which remains the most comprehensive exegesis of the theory. It should, 
however, be noted that the theory has been elaborated further in a number of articles-
sometimes responding to criticism-by Professors Fishbein, Ajzen, and others. For examples of 
criticism, see Vernon E. Cronen & Richard L. Conville, Fishbein's Conception of Belief Strength: 
A Theoretical, Methodological and Experimental Critique, 42(2) SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 143, 147-
150 (1975) (presenting three studies that cast doubt on Fishbein's theory of attitude); Joseph R. 
Priester & Monique A. Fleming, Artifact or Meaningful Theoretical Constructs?: Examining 
Evidence for Nonbelief- and Belief-Based Attitude Change Processes, 6(1) J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 
67, 69 (1997) (noting and describing the evidence for a number of nonbelief-based attitude 
change processes). For further exposition and response to these criticisms, see Martin Fishbein & 
Susan Middlestadt, Noncognitive Effects on Attitude Formation and Change: Fact or Artifact?, 
4(2) J. OF CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 181, 184 (1995) (analyzing a number of critical studies and 
arguing that the contribution of factors, other than belief-based expectancy-value measures to 
the prediction of attitude, can be seen as a methodological artifact of using inappropriate 
measures); see also Martin Fishbein & Susan E. Middlestadt, A Striking Lack of Evidence for 
Nonbelief-Based Attitude Formation and Change: A Response to Five Commentaries, 6(1) J. 
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 107, 108 (1997) (arguing that most criticism avoids assessing the belief-
based structure that underlies attitude formation). 
35. FISHBEIN & AJZEN, supra note 26, at 30-31; see also Lynn R. Anderson & Martin 
Fishbein, Prediction of Attitude From the Number, Strength, and Evaluative Aspect of Beliefs 
About the Attitude Object: A Comparison of Summation and Congruity Theories, 2(3) J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 437 (1965) (arguing that basic summation of belief and 
evaluation yields significantly better predictions of attitude than congruity theory). 
36. For practical examples and further analysis, see Amnesty International's website, 
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/isr-action-detention (last visited Nov. 4, 2006). 
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procedure both positively as providing greater protection against 
terrorist activities and negatively as reducing civil liberties. The 
certainty with which a State holds these beliefs, in conjunction with 
its evaluations of the effects of each of these outcomes, can determine 
that country's attitude regarding the behavior. To see why, assume a 
scale of certainty that runs from 0 (no certainty) to +100 (strong 
certainty) and a similar scale for evaluation -100 (strong dislike) to 
+100 (strong like). Applying these factors to administrative detention 
could have the results set forth in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 
Belief Certainty Evaluation be 
Protects against Terrorist Acts +50 +50 +2500 
Restricts Civil Liberties +40 -40 -1600 
Aa~Ibiei =+900 
Based on these beliefs, a State would be inclined to use administrative 
detention, but not very strongly (because the utility is only +900). 
C. The Need-Reinforcement Principle 
The notion that States value their reputation among other 
States is, of course, not new to discussions of international law. 37 
Early proponents of this view discussed the "need to preserve 
solidarity with one's fellow States as an explanation for compliance."38 
These scholars discussed the incentive to comply with international 
law as based on prodding from other States with whom that State is 
37. See, e.g., Downs & Jones, supra note 3, at 96 (arguing that states have multiple 
reputations which vary in connection with different agreements, and thus, while reputation does 
matter, the standard notion that states keep commitments out of concern for their reputations 
may overestimate its impact); Hathaway, Between Power and Principle, supra note 5, at 494 
(discussing reputation as a consideration that influences States' decisions whether to commit to 
and comply with treaties); Colin B. Picker, Reputational Fallacies in International Law: A 
Comparative Review of United States and Canadian Trade Actions, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 67, 69-
70 (2004) (''The potential harm of reputation derives from the fact that state reputation is an 
important and vital component in the smooth operation of international law. With few 
traditional legal mechanisms to ensure that states comply with international law, it is arguable 
that reputation is an important, even crucial, mechanism for securing state compliance."). 
38. Koh, Why Do Nations, supra note 3, at 2613 (internal citations omitted); see also 
Nathaniel Berman, The Paradoxes of Legitimacy: Case Studies in International Legal 
Modernism, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 583, 585 (1991) (describing Alfred Verdross's theory that 
obligation in international law must be grounded in a basic norm, which is "the fundamental rule 
whose function is to institute the supreme creative authority of law"). 
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engaged. 39 Others still suggested that States shared a "common 
consciousness" that led them to comply with international law because 
"particular rules are nested within a much broader fabric of ongoing 
communal relations."40 
More recently, international relations theorists have focused on 
interdependence as the underlying mechanism through which 
reputational factors affect state action. 41 These theorists view 
international law as reflecting the strategies engaged in by States 
involved in long-term relationships to increase their esteem within the 
global community.42 Social norms and the rules that embody them, 
they assume, influence the strategies pursued by States within these 
games. 43 Our expressive theory builds on and bridges some of these 
understandings. It provides a definite understanding of the forces that 
lead to the pull of international society that many scholars have 
identified as a key to compliance. Further, it bases the desire for 
reputational benefits in a preference for esteem that develops from 
beneficial interaction with other members of a group. 
Most law and economics scholars conceive of norms as arising 
from cooperation problems that confront rational individuals acting in 
their own self-interest.44 A classic example of a cooperation problem is 
39. See Koh, Why Do Nations, supra note 3, at 2613 ("[T]he interwar years modified the 
process-based strand of thinking about the compliance question by mixing process with 
reputation: the 'solidaristic' strand that emerged derived a nation's incentive to obey from the 
encouragement and prodding of other nations with whom it is engaged in a managerial, 
discursive legal process." (emphasis in original)). 
40. Id. at 2617 (arguing that English scholars developed the notion of a "common 
consciousness" in invoking the Grotian notion of "international society," within which nations 
comply for communitarian reasons). 
41. SLAUGHTER, supra note 10, at 170 (noting that government networks "could develop and 
support the implementation of 'network norms' that would strengthen the integrity and 
competence of all their members"). As explained by Koh, "scholars began to look as well at 
transnational networks among nonstate actors, international institutions, and domestic political 
structures as important mediating forces in international society . . . .. They understood 
compliance with international law to result almost entirely from the functional benefits such 
compliance provides." Koh, Why Do Nations, supra note 3, at 2624-25. 
42. See, e.g., Downs & Jones, supra note 3, at S96 (averring that the reputational 
consequences of defection require States to engage in a complex cost-benefit analysis when 
deciding whether to comply with their obligations); Anne E. Sartori, The Might of the Pen: A 
Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes, 56 lNT'L ORG. 121, 123 (2002) 
(noting that States behave with a view to how the reputations they engender will impact future 
and repeated transactions). 
43. See generally Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International Law: A 
Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 143, 167 (2001) (extrapolating 
game theory to international legal regimes). 
44. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Mouement, 
84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2126 n.235 (1996) (noting that individuals may be hesitant to act in an 
altruistic fashion unless there is some assurance that others will be compelled to act in a similar 
fashion); Steven A. Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 7 n.21 (1999) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. 
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the "prisoner's dilemma," which posits two rational, self-interested 
individuals who must choose between alternate strategies. In the 
circumstance of the game, pursuit of individual self interest leads to 
worse results for each individual than if he or she had cooperated with 
the other. 45 
Take, for example, the following scenario between prisoners 
Row and Column, who have been placed in separate cells at the police 
station and are being questioned. If one inmate tells on the other, the 
tattler will be let off for cooperation, and the other detainee will get a 
three-year sentence. If neither tells, each will be found guilty of a 
lesser offense and serve one year in prison. If both tell, each will be 
convicted of a more significant offense and incarcerated for two years. 
The options and consequences can be diagrammed as follows. 
Figure 3 
Cooperate Defect 
(withhold) (tell) 
Cooperate {withhold) Ill 3/0 
Defect (tell) 0/3 2/2 
Given these circumstances, Row will always tell. Here's why: 
Assume first that Column does tell. If Row fails to do likewise, he will 
get three years in jail; if he does tell, he will receive only a two-year 
sentence. Now assume that Column does not tell. Row will not be 
imprisoned if he tells, but he will be punished with one year in jail if 
REV. 903, 918 (1996) ("Good social norms solve collective action problems by encouraging people 
to do useful things that they would not do without the relevant norms."); Steven A. Hetcher, 
Norm Proselytizers Create a Privacy Entitlement in Cyberspace, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 
902-03 n.90 (2001) (describing four alternative accounts of how norms may serve as solutions to 
iterated collective action problems); Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in 
Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765, 797 (1998) ("[T]he social norm describes the 
behavior that arises in equilibrium. It is not that X punishes Y for violating a social norm; 
rather, X (and many other people) avoids Y because Y's behavior reveals to X that association 
withY will not serve X's interests."); Elmer J. Schaefer, Predicting Defection, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 
443, 462 (2002) (discussing social norms, specifically signaling, as an answer to defections in 
prisoner's dilemma problems with cooperation theories). 
45. The most successful strategy is the well-known "tit-for-tat" strategy that emerged 
victorious from a number of computer tournaments run by Robert Axelrod. Following the 
tournaments, Axelrod simulated natural selection with sixty-three programs by adjusting the 
number of offspring produced in each successive round based on a strategy's performance in the 
previous round. After one thousand rounds of play, weak programs became extinct, and so did 
some predatory programs that had survived by exploiting dwindling programs lower in the food 
chain. Interestingly, in this game, which was designed to simulate Darwinian natural selection, 
TFT won again, just as it had in Axelrod's tournaments. See generally David Crump, Game 
Theory, Legislation, and the Multiple Meanings of Equality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 331, 377-78 
(2001). 
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he remains silent. In these circumstances, it is better for the self-
interested Row to tell regardless of what Column does. The dominant 
strategy for both players will therefore be to tell, resulting in each 
getting locked up for two years. By contrast, if neither tells, each gets 
only one year in jail. Consequently, the pursuit of individual self-
interest by Row and Column leads to worse results than if they had 
cooperated and both withheld information. 
While defection is the dominant strategy in a one-time play of 
the prisoner's dilemma, cooperation is a natural result of such a 
problem in situations where the parties will play the game a 
substantial number of times.46 Let us assume that Column and Row 
are now, respectively, a wholesaler and retailer of goods. They want to 
create a relationship whereby Column will supply the goods at a 
certain cost. If Column delivers the quality of goods agreed upon, both 
parties will make two. If Column cheats and sends goods of lesser 
quality he will make three and Row will make zero, but Row will end 
their relationship and Column will have to look for other cooperative 
partners. A similar result would occur if Row cheats, for example, by 
challenging the quality of the goods and withholding full payment. 
Assuming a desire to play for a number of times, it is better for the 
parties to cooperate than to sever their ties. This is because making 
two regularly is better than making three a few times while also 
developing a reputation for being untrustworthy and so losing future 
cooperative opportunities. As Professor Eric Posner has pointed out, 
"logic shows that the optimal move is always to cooperate."47 Norms 
are, in turn, artifacts of the long-term cooperation of these rational 
individuals. 
The game-theoretic model of norm formation is, of course, 
extremely parsimonious. In particular, it does little to help us identify 
specifically the way in which individual beliefs or preferences can be 
linked to the behavioral standards embodied by norms. Nor does the 
model provide an understanding of why individuals comply with 
norms. We will use the concept of need reinforcement in conjunction 
with the basic social psychology of norms and groups to inform the 
rational choice model, and in particular provide an understanding of 
these issues. By identifying norms as reflections of aggregate 
preference and normative behavior as a signal of the importance of 
group standing to an individual, the model provides a framework for 
46. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 19 (Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (developing the 
foundation for a theory of norms as signals of one's cooperativeness). 
47. Id. at 16. Posner also suggests that the logic of cooperation extends to games involving 
more than two players by assuming that everyone has sufficient information about other people's 
past activities. !d. Thus, defection from one pairwise transaction will not lead to a "clean slate" in 
the next pairwise transaction. Id. 
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considering how estimations of group preference may inform and 
effect behavior. 
The sociological model leads to a particular view of groups and 
norms. Pursuant to the rational choice perspective, groups form when 
individuals come together for the mutual satisfaction of their own 
needs. 48 The individual is the basic unit of such a conception of the 
group, 49 and interdependence is the force that holds these individuals 
together. 50 In this sense, the group is simply a reflection, or 
aggregation, of the individuals that comprise it, and the idea of a 
group as something other than a collection of individuals is 
meaningless. 51 The idea of a social norm within this framework is, in 
turn, simply the reflection of the aggregate preferences of the 
individuals that comprise the group. 52 That is, norms are the 
reflection of the perceived majority position of any group of individuals 
and can be determined by simply combining the individual positions of 
the majority of group members. 53 
It is difficult, however, to reconcile this view of normative 
behavioral standards with the notion that :q.ormative behavior 
provides information on one's willingness to cooperate with other 
group members. The connection between certain moral norms, such as 
"do unto others as they would do unto you," and one's cooperativeness, 
is apparent. It becomes harder, however, to see the relationship 
between other norms-for instance eating hot dogs at a baseball 
game-and one's cooperative nature.54 
48. See, e.g., MUZAFER SHERIF, GROUP CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: THEIR SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 64-69 (1966) (illustrating how shared identity and group organization arise as 
derivative phenomena from interdependence between group members). 
49. This concept has its roots in some of the earliest work of social psychology. As early as 
1924, psychologists argued that the individual was the only psychological reality and that there 
was nothing in the group that was not in the individual. FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT, SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 4 (The Riverside Press 1924) ("There is no psychology of groups which is not 
essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals."). 
50. John C. Turner, Social Categorization and the Self-Concept: A Social Cognitive Theory 
of Group Behavior, 2 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 77, 79 (1985). 
51. See ALLPORT, supra note 49, at 4 (arguing that the individual is the only psychological 
reality and that there is nothing in the group that is not in the individual). 
52. See Turner, supra note 50, at 79 (discussing how groups are defined in terms of shared 
values that prescribe beliefs, attitudes and conduct). 
53. ld. at 82 (observing that various theories of social influence have been characterized by 
individualism, as evidenced by the assumption that the social norm is assumed to be exactly the 
sum of its parts). 
54. See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms and Economic 
Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 676-78 (2001) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL 
NORMS, supra note 46) [hereinafter McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates]. He asserts that it 
would be inefficient for all of these behaviors to act as signals of cooperativeness. Instead, he 
suggests, the most efficient way to create a reputation for cooperativeness is, simply, to cooperate 
with others. 
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Posner has attempted to solve this problem by describing 
norms as behavioral equilibria that result from people signaling their 
discount rates to one another.55 He suggests that preferences 
regarding the value of future payoffs differ among the population. 
Thus, people with low discount rates are less likely to defect from a 
cooperation game because they value future payoffs higher than most. 
Posner deems such people "good types."56 In order to distinguish 
themselves from bad types, good types engage in behaviors that signal 
their higher discount rates. Because they value future payoffs more 
highly, good types are willing to undertake more expensive signaling 
behaviors. Norms, to Posner, are the behavioral equilibria that result 
from good and bad types signaling their discount rates.57 While 
Posner's effort continues to be the most comprehensive attempt to 
explain norm formation, and, in particular, to explain the normative 
basis for a number of specific behaviors, it has been subject to 
criticism. 58 We discuss below one major criticism concerning the 
inability of the theory to explain how States choose which behaviors do 
and do not act as signals. 59 
The social-psychological model provides a simpler explanation 
of how norms reflect a State's cooperativeness. This explanation is 
rooted in the mutual attraction that arises between States that are 
interdependent. This attraction is rooted in the operation of a need 
satisfaction or "reinforcement" principle: mutual liking between group 
members reflects the extent to which positive, gratifying or rewarding 
outcomes are associated directly or indirectly with being in a 
cooperative relationship with each other.60 The greater the perceived 
rewards of group membership, the greater the attraction to the group, 
and the less likelihood of defection. 
55. POSNER, supra note 46, at 19-23. 
56. Id. at 18-19 (noting that a good type is more likely to cooperate in a repeated prisoner's 
dilemma than a bad type is, because the good type cares more about the future payoffs that are 
lost if cooperation fails). 
57. !d. at 18-22 (finding the origin of the variation of social norms across time and place in 
the struggle by good types to differentiate themselves from bad types via signaling). 
58. See, e.g., Steven A. Hetcher, Commentaries on Eric Posner's Law and Social Norms: 
Cyberian Signals, 36 U. RICH. L. REV 327, 359 (2002) ("Posner errs, then, by using signaling of 
discount rates as the sole explanation for norms."); Dan M. Kahan, Commentaries on Eric 
Posner's Law and Social Norms: Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law 
and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 371 (2002) ("Posner's signaling model, as it 
stands .. _ should not be trusted to guide public policy even provisionally for four distinct 
reasons." (emphasis in original)); see also McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates, supra note 54, at 
627 (stating that Posner's discount-rate signaling theory of social norms exaggerates the 
importance of the motivation and mechanisms it employs and understates the importance of the 
normative origins of norms). 
59. See infra Part III.D. 
60. Turner, supra note 50, at 79. 
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Normative pressure is, in turn, an external force that affects a 
State's behavior only to the extent it is concerned about other States 
to which it is attracted.61 Put simply, if a State wants to do something 
it perceives is not condoned by other group members, and there is a 
sense of mutual liking or attraction between that State and the other 
group members, the State risks disapproval from others to which it is 
attracted.62 A group member who seeks esteem is thus required to 
estimate which behaviors are approved by other group members. The 
more uniformly held and highly valued the preference, the more likely 
it will assert normative force. 
Let us return to the example of administrative detention and a 
given State's belief about group preferences regarding this behavior. 
Consider two different possible levels of belief regarding the norm. In 
one case, imagine that the State believes that ninety percent of the 
group does not condone administrative detention (in which case that 
State's utilization of detention will offend nine out of ten group 
members), and in the other it believes only sixty percent of the group 
does not condone administrative detention (i.e., that the procedure 
will only offend six of ten group members). Depending on its own 
beliefs regarding administrative detention, this difference may have 
an impact on the State's willingness to undertake the practice. 
These differences can be measured in terms of their impacts on 
expected utility. Recall that the State may evaluate the procedure 
both positively as providing greater protection against terrorist 
activities, and also negatively as reducing civil liberties. Assume that 
only these two beliefs, along with a belief regarding the subjective 
norm, are relevant to the behavior. Assume further that beliefs about 
the behavior are held constant--our State prefers the use of 
administrative detention but does not hold this preference very 
strongly (as set forth above, +900 units). The certainty with which it 
holds beliefs about the norm will thus determine the State's attitude 
regarding the behavior. Consider the effect on utility in the situation 
when certainty of belief regarding the subjective norm drops from 
ninety-five to thirty, as set forth in Figures 4 and 5: 
61. Rational choice scholars intuitively understand this attraction. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, 
Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1577, 1592-93 (2000) ("Business, politics, love, and war cause people to form relationships with 
each other. These relationships create opportunities for mutual benefit from cooperation and also 
opportunities for people to exploit each other."). 
62. JOHN C. TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-CATEGORIZATION 
THEORY 20 (Basil Blackwell Inc. 1987) ("[W]here people perceive, believe or expect to achieve 
mutual satisfaction from their association, they will tend to associate in a solitary fashion, to 
develop positive interpersonal attitudes and to influence each other's attitudes and behaviour on 
the basis of their power to satisfy needs for information and reward each other."). 
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Figure 4 
Belief Certainty Evaluation be 
Will result in Sanction +95 -10 -950 
Protects against +50 +50 +2500 
Terrorist Acts 
Restricts Civil Liberties +40 -40 -1600 
Ao=I biei =-50 
Figure 5 
Belief Certainty Evaluation be 
Will result in Sanction +30 -10 -300 
Protects against +50 +50 +2500 
Terrorist Acts 
Restricts Civil Liberties +40 -40 -1600 
Ao=I biei =+600 
Because the State's understanding of the uniformity with 
which a belief is held (+30 versus +95) impacts its estimation of 
normative sanction, the State will feel constrained to act by normative 
control in the latter case (because the utility is -50) and not 
constrained in the former (where the utility remains positive, +600). 
Now, consider that our group member values group 
membership much more strongly. For example, contrast the situation 
of an emerging democracy with that of an established democratic 
regime. To the nascent State, approbation from and inclusion in the 
broader global community may be valued as more crucial to its 
international standing than would be the case for an accepted group 
member.63 Thus, its negative evaluation of the normative 
consequences of acting out of step with group attitudes will be much 
more substantial (we assume an evaluation for this example of -50). 
63. We recognize that other factors will also play a significant role in this process. For 
example, the anchoring and framing heuristics may significantly impact estimations of a nation's 
perception of the group norm. A nation that has, for many years, shown a strong proclivity for 
group memhership, but that violates norms a few times, may thus do so with a certain amount of 
immunity. Continued violation, however, may clearly signal a change in the importance of group 
membership to the nation. See Alex Geisinger, Are Norms Efficient? Pluralistic Ignorance, 
Heuristics, and the Use of Norms as Private Regulation, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1, 19·24 (2005) 
(descrihing how heuristics may influence norm perception generally). 
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This evaluation will result in conformity regarding a much larger 
number of behaviors, as illustrated in Figure 6: 
Figure 6 
Belief Certainty Evaluation be 
Will result in Sanction +30 -50 -1500 
Protects against Terrorist +50 +50 +2500 
Acts 
Restricts Civil Liberties +40 -40 -1600 
Ao=Ebiei = -600 
In such a case, even a small perceived certainty (+30) of sanction will 
result in conformity. 
The more a State conforms to perceived group norms, the more 
likely other group members are to perceive that State to be strongly 
attracted to the group. The willingness of the above-mentioned 
emerging State to abide by international norms reflects its deep value 
of acceptance by the global community. This is particularly the case 
when States exhibit group conformity with less certain norms that are 
not universally held. This commitment to group membership acts as a 
strong signal of the emerging State's unwillingness to defect from 
cooperative endeavors with other group members. 
The need-reinforcement addition to the basic rational choice 
model of behavior thus establishes a very particular view of groups 
and norm formation with the rational individual at its core. Norms 
arise only because rational individuals attain benefits from interacting 
with others and thus develop a free standing desire for others' 
acceptance. Individuals attempt to determine the preferences of the 
majority, and failure to act in accordance with the view of others 
negatively impacts one's perceived attractiveness to other group 
members. The higher one values group membership, the less likely 
one is to defect from cooperative endeavors. 
The need-reinforcement principle provides a basis for including 
in the model of expressive effects of law a separate preference for 
esteem from others. The Reasoned-Action model describes this desire 
for esteem as the subjective norm. The desire for esteem will join other 
preferences that underlie a State's attitude to determine the utility of 
any particular regulated behavior. Such an understanding of norms 
allows us to model how international law and process may affect 
decisions regarding the utility of entering into and abiding by a 
particular legal regime. 
2007] EXPRESSIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 
II. AN EXPRESSIVE MODEL OF RATIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE 
According to the expressive model, international legal process 
can affect a State's understanding of the social norm through two 
distinct pathways. First, international process can change other 
States' preferences by providing information on objective reality. As 
the preferences of a number of States change, so too may norms and/or 
norm certainty. In cases where preferences change enough, a new 
norm may develop and become entrenched. Second, international 
process may directly communicate information on existing aggregate 
preference. That is, when normative belief is uncertain or not yet 
developed, international process can provide information on the beliefs 
of other States that will permit a State to develop its own 
understanding of the aggregate preferences of others. In such a case, 
norms haven't changed but certainty regarding the norm has. 
A. International Processes 
Under the expressive model, international law and process are 
seen as means of attempting to change behavior by changing beliefs 
either about objective reality or about the subjective norm. 
Ratification of a treaty also impacts a number of beliefs about norms 
and thus also affects compliance. Let us consider each in order, using 
examples that isolate each of the different forces at work. We will 
start with the case of global warming.64 The first element of the 
expressive model suggests that one way to change a State's desires 
regarding the regulation of the causes of global warming or 
compliance with a global warming treaty is simply to update its belief 
of objective reality. Consider the way in which over time science has 
changed estimations of the likelihood that global warming, with its 
attendant negative consequences, is occurring as the result of human-
made changes to the natural environment. At some point, the 
certainty of harm will increase until it overcomes any reservations 
about ratifying or complying with a treaty. Take as an example a 
model of a State with only three salient beliefs regarding compliance 
with a global warming treaty. Figure 7 illustrates the salient beliefs 
held by that State during a period of early science in which there is 
little certainty that human-made materials change global climate. 
64. As we will discuss infra, compliance with human rights treaties results primarily from 
the impact of international law on the subjective norm. However, international law may 
influence compliance through other expressive forces, such as by changing perceptions of 
objective reality that, in turn, change preferences for regulation. We turn to the example of 
environmental treaties in these sections to illustrate a variety of these expressive forces 
specifically because human rights treaties alone cannot be used to do so. 
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Figure 8 illustrates the salient beliefs held by that State during a 
period of later science when there is greater certainty that human-
made materials change global climate. 
Figure 7 
Belief Certainty Evaluation be 
No regulation will cause +20 -80 -1600 
sea levels to rise resulting 
Ill 
coastal region losses. 
No regulation will increase +15 -90 -1370 
skin cancers. 
No regulation will benefit +80 +90 +7200 
economy 
Ao=L b;e; +4230 
Figure 8 
Belief Certainty Evaluation be 
No regulation will cause +60 -80 -4800 
sea levels to rise resulting 
in coastal region losses. 
No regulation will +60 -90 -5400 
increase skin cancers. 
No regulation will benefit +80 +90 +7200 
economy 
Ao =Lbiei -3000 
Under this model, changing belief about objective reality results in a 
changed attitude toward regulation or compliance. 
Of course, changing attitudinal belief can also change beliefs 
regarding the subjective norm. Norms, under our theory, simply 
reflect the aggregated preferences of members of the group of States to 
which that State belongs. As changes in understandings of objective 
reality result in increased preference for regulation of global warming, 
this in turn changes estimations of the likelihood of being sanctioned 
for failing to abide by the preferences of the majority of group 
members. At some point, the changed perception of group preference 
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will reach a tipping point and a new, pro-regulation norm will become 
entrenched. 
International process may also provide information that is 
directly relevant to the subjective norm. Take as an example a newly 
formed Islamic democracy. Assume that this country's culture 
historically did not value women's social and political participation at 
a level equivalent to the beliefs currently held by the majority of 
democratic States. When considering whether to ratify the already 
existing Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women ("CEDAW''),65 the Islamic democracy will infer from 
the CEDAW's existence a prevailing norm that favors women's 
equality.66 To the extent that the Islamic democracy values 
membership in the global community of democratic States, it will feel 
increased pressure to ratify the CEDAW as a way to avoid social 
sanction. ln this manner, the existence of treaties or other 
international regimes can inform directly the subjective norm. 
Context plays a significant role in the way that ratification 
occurs. Given their dependence on scientific information, 
environmental treaties may be influenced to a large degree by changes 
in objective reality, like recognition that global warming is the result 
of man-made emissions. Trade regimes may be more dependent on 
reciprocal benefits or coercion, for example, conditioning a State's 
trade status on membership in the World Trade Organization or on its 
agreement not to counterfeit goods. Human rights regimes, on the 
other hand-which in the main are neither reciprocal nor influenced 
by changing scientific understandings-are relatively more dependent 
on direct normative influence; in other words, States ratify the 
CEDAW because of a general desire to be members of the 
international community rather than new information about the 
biological realities of women. 
B. The Interaction of International and Domestic Processes 
An important issue in the developing compliance literature 
concerns how ratification of a treaty may influence domestic 
65. G.A. Res. 34/180, at 193, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Sept. 
3, 1981). 
66. An additional factor that may impact normative belief is the CEDA Ws embodiment of a 
more universally held norm of equality. To the extent that a State believes equality to be a 
universally held norm, it will expect a large number of nations to be willing to enforce it. See 
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Social Norms, 96 U. MICH. L. 
REV. 338 (1997) [hereinafter McAdams, The Origin]. 
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lawmakers to regulate behavior.67 That is, once a treaty has been 
ratified by a State, why and when does the State choose to conform to 
the treaty's terms? A simple answer is that States that ratify treaties 
have obligations to abide by them. This notion motivates claims that 
liberal States-that is, States that believe in the rule of law-are more 
likely to abide by their legal obligations than others.68 However, this 
response does not address the more indirect way in which treaty 
ratification may permeate the "consciousness" of a State so as to affect 
everything from judicial decision making to domestic regulation and 
even the behavior of individual citizens. A developing body of 
international law scholarship asks the important question of how 
international norms may affect domestic understanding of an issue. 
This Section provides a more detailed analysis of how this mechanism 
works.69 
Ratification of a treaty may influence domestic norms, which in 
turn can affect both citizen behavior and domestic policy. By 
demonstrating how ratification affects norms and preference, the 
expressive theory provides an understanding of the mechanisms by 
which this happens. Generally, ratification of a treaty may provide 
information on the aggregate preference of the majority in a liberal 
state where acts of the State's representatives (in this case the 
ratification of a treaty) are sometimes presumed to reflect the will of 
the majority. 70 To the extent this is the case, a treaty represents the 
67. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, Measuring the Effects, supra note 6, at 173 ("[T]he 
incorporation of human rights norms [into domestic law] is a process; treaty law plays an 
important role in this process."); Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties, supra note 5, at 1938-39 
(discussing how "treaties play an important constraining role" in domestic law). The focus on 
domestic politics' influence on compliance is often associated with the liberalist view. For an 
excellent discussion, see Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties, supra note 5, at 1952-55. 
68. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and 
the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361, 366 (1999) 
("[S]cholars are exploring whether liberal democratic states-with representative institutions 
and a commitment to the rule of law-are more amenable to legal relationships and arguments 
and more prone to comply with legal rules than states with different domestic regimes."); Anne 
Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1920-21 (1992) (arguing that liberal States are more likely to act within 
the "zone oflaw" than others). 
69. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Checkel, International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the 
Rationalist-Constructivist Divide, 3 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 473, 474 (1997) (noting that the domestic 
effect of international norms is to sometimes constrain and sometimes constitute); Andrew P. 
Cortell & James W. Davis, Jr., Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A 
Research Agenda, 2 INT'L STUD. REV. 65, 86 (2000) ("[T]he effects of an international norm cannot 
he understood independent of the norm's salience in the domestic political discourse."). 
70. See also Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1603, 1647 (2000) (incorporating endogenous preference derived from social norms 
into rational choice theory). See generally Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of 
Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000) [hereinafter McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory] 
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will of the electorate, and individuals will update their beliefs 
regarding majority preference accordingly. Ratification of a treaty may 
also inform individual preference which, in turn, further changes 
estimations of normative belief. As normative belief becomes more 
congruous with the treaty that was ratified, failure to abide by it will 
more likely result in social sanctions for individual behaviors contrary 
to the treaty's goals. In these ways, the certainty of social sanction for 
failure to abide by a norm of the international community becomes 
greater with the ratification of a treaty. To the extent that domestic 
policy in liberal States reflects the will of the public, changes in 
perceptions of majority preference will also influence domestic law 
making. Moreover, changed understanding of objective reality may 
also influence judicial decision making. 
The following Subsections analyze how ratification affects 
normative belief and forces of domestic compliance. The first Sub-
section considers how ratification may directly impact the subjective 
norm of the ratifying State's citizens. Once we have demonstrated how 
ratification affects belief, we will discuss how and when changed belief 
translates into different market behavior and domestic regulation. 
The second Subsection considers indirect influences of ratification on 
the subjective norm. 
1. Direct Influences on the Subjective Norm 
There are a number of ways in which ratification can directly 
influence the subjective norms of citizens in a State that has ratified a 
treaty. Primary mechanisms again include providing information that 
changes individual preference, which may ultimately affect 
perceptions of majority belief, and providing information that leads 
one to infer an increased likelihood that the international norm will be 
socially enforced at a domestic level. We will examine each of these 
possibilities, starting with the latter. 
Ratification of a treaty can provide information on what the 
majority of a State believes and thus serve to change or reinforce what 
citizens will sanction socially and, in the case of some democratic 
regimes, affect politicians' willingness to act. The mechanism by which 
ratification influences normative belief will be particularly influential 
in cases where there is great uncertainty regarding aggregate 
preference or objective reality. Let us consider the historical example 
of perceptions of ozone depletion in the United States up to and after 
(presenting a theory that law changes behavior by signaling the underlying attitudes of a 
community). 
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ratification of the Montreal Protocol.71 In 1986 great uncertainty still 
existed regarding the effects of human-made emissions on ozone.72 
America's ratification of the treaty, however, served as a coalescing 
moment that mobilized the population to act in support of the treaty's 
goals.73 Indeed, just weeks after the United States ratified the 
Montreal Protocol, many communities began to ban products made 
with ozone depleting chemicals, "giving American industry a clear 
indication of the public mood."74 
Expressive theory provides a means for describing this 
"ratification effect." Treaty ratification may change beliefs through a 
number of different inferential mechanisms. First, in States where 
treaties are subject to the approval of politically accountable branches 
before they can be ratified, ratification can carry with it information 
that a treaty's standards reflect the will of the majority. A person who 
is unsure of current majority preference but who believes that treaties 
will be ratified only when the majority approves of their standards 
will update his or her belief regarding the preferences of the majority 
as a result of ratification. 75 
The United States's ratification of the Montreal Protocol also 
provided a basis for an individual to increase his or her certainty of 
objective reality (in this case that ozone depletion is a significant 
problem) and affect preferences for regulation. The inferential process 
is similar to the one discussed earlier regarding how the willingness of 
other States to ratify may affect an individual State's belief. If one 
believes his or her State is generally unwilling to regulate behaviors 
subject to a treaty, but the State ratifies in any case, one may infer 
71. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 
1522 U.N.T.S. 3, was ratified by the United States on April 21, 1988, and came into force on 
January 1, 1989. 
72. See RICHARD BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE 
PLANET 15 (Harvard Univ. Press 1998) (stating that "great uncertainties still remained" in 1986 
in understanding the science of ozone). 
73. See id. at 315 (describing how government efforts to inform their constituents about 
treaty obligations influenced politicians and private entities to act responsibly for the 
environment). 
74. ld. at 102. 
75. There is a concern regarding this mechanism. Many citizens simply do not believe that 
ratification correlates with majority beliefs. Public choice theory in particular suggests that 
special interest groups capture legislatures and thus that legislative acts do not reflect popular 
attitudes. Individuals that believe this to be the way legislation is created will not infer that 
legislation reflects the will of the majority. McAdams responds to this concern by suggesting that 
there are "weak" and "strong" forms of public interest theory and that, in some cases, inferences 
of majority influence on decision-making are still possible. See McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory, 
supra note 70, at 330-31. As our expressive theory clarifies, the strong or weak version of public 
choice theory is relevant to the effect of ratification on the subjective norm to the extent they are 
preexisting beliefs held by individuals. The weaker the belief in public choice theory, the more 
likely an individual is to believe that law correlates with majority opinion. 
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from ratification that the problem was worse than originally 
contemplated. 76 Indeed, ratification may well have provided the main 
impetus for a change in preferences, and ultimately norms, in the 
United States. As individuals inferred from United States ratification 
that the problem of ozone emissions was "real" or greater than they 
previously believed, they adjusted their preferences for regulation 
accordingly. As more individuals changed from a preference for no 
regulation to a preference for regulation, a tipping point was reached 
and a new norm entrenched. 
We should note that our focus is on the effects of ratification on 
norms. This should not be taken to suggest that other elements of 
international lawmaking cannot affect normative belief. In the case of 
ozone, United States-led efforts mobilized much of the scientific 
community to create the evidence needed to link soundly CFCs to 
ozone depletion. The science alone, in cases where there is not 
competing science, could very well affect the preferences of those who 
learn of it through newspaper articles or other sources. The impact of 
international process on belief should not be underestimated. 
However, as the effect of the Montreal Protocol suggests, ratification 
itself is an important and distinct influence on domestic regulation 
and behavior. 
We have established up to this point that treaty ratification 
can influence individual preferences, as well as beliefs about the 
preferences of others. Both of these forces affect the decisions of 
individuals within the marketplace. In the case of ozone, information 
linking CFCs to things such as Styrofoam food packaging and aerosol 
spray cans changed people's preferences regarding the types of 
products they chose to use. As more people changed preferences 
regarding products, a norm in favor of products made without CFCs 
became entrenched, adding pressure to those who still preferred CFC-
produced products to change their behavior or face social sanction. 
This substantially decreased demand for such products and cleared 
the way for new CFC-free technology. 77 
A change in norms would also likely affect the willingness of 
regulators to pass laws controlling the use of CFCs-at least when 
regulators see themselves as accountable to the populace. This, of 
course, highlights again the reasons why liberal regimes may be more 
greatly influenced by international process than others. Not only are 
76. See Richard McAdams & Dhammika Dharmapla, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the 
Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2003). 
77. See BENEDICK, supra note 72, at 104-05 (describing how ratification of the Montreal 
Protocol led to consumer pressure which in turn led to phase out of CFC products such as spray 
cans in England); see also id. at 310-11 (describing the "decisive" effects of consumer pressure on 
phase outs of products made with CFCs in England, Taiwan and Germany). 
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individuals in a liberal state more likely to believe that law reflects 
majority preferences and thus update their own normative belief, but 
politicians are also more likely to care about majority belief when they 
choose to regulate. Totalitarian and other non-democratic regimes feel 
less pressure from a change in citizen perceptions. This is not to 
suggest that what citizens perceive to be important has no impact in 
such regimes; the effects on citizens described above may also 
influence leaders. Similarly, to the extent that international process 
may affect preference and not just normative belief, the governing 
members of society may change their preferences regarding the need 
for regulation. Where the influence of citizen concern is omitted, 
however (such as in non-liberal regimes), the ability of ratification and 
process to effect change will decrease. The key to compliance in such 
cases is not the domestic impact on the citizenry, but the impact on 
government officials' preferences and their concern about the esteem 
from other members of international society. 
Finally, we must consider how changing perceptions also 
influence judicial decision making through these mechanisms. A clear 
example is United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on the death 
penalty, determining the extent to which this punishment is "cruel 
and unusual" under the Eighth Amendment. 78 To make this 
assessment, the Justices reference "evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society."79 Abolishing the death 
penalty for convicted felons under the age of sixteen as offensive to 
"civilized standards of decency" in 1988, the Court noted that its 
conclusion was "consistent with the views that have been expressed by 
respected professional organizations, by other States that share our 
Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western 
European community."80 The following year the Court held that 
executing the mentally retarded could not categorically be said to 
violate either the Eighth Amendment or national norms.81 However, 
because of the consistent American state movement away from this 
practice, as well as its almost complete absence internationally, in 
2002 the Court banned those executions.82 Last year the Court further 
proscribed the death penalty by prohibiting executions of juveniles 
under the age of eighteen, relying heavily on the "relevance of the 
views of the international community."83 Among the evidence cited 
78. For international parallels, see WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY lN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002). 
79. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). 
80. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988). 
81. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989). 
82. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002). 
83. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (internal citation omitted). 
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was the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
includes a ban on juvenile executions.84 Because that treaty had been 
ratified by every State worldwide except Somalia and the United 
States, the Court found that "the United States now stands alone in a 
world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty."85 
The Supreme Court, in its death penalty jurisprudence, 
explicitly recognizes processes of expressive theory. In looking to the 
beliefs of other States, the Court responds to two main concerns. The 
first is the impact of jurisprudence on global esteem, which the Court 
explicitly recognizes when it notes that approving the death penalty 
would leave the United States "standing alone" in the community of 
States. The Court also clearly demonstrates its understanding that 
international norms and treaties may influence domestic 
jurisprudence by influencing our domestic beliefs regarding the 
underlying issues. The exogenous influence is a product of the United 
States' self-identification as a culturally Western State. Consider the 
simple syllogism behind the Supreme Court's analysis of the death 
penalty: (1) the United States is a civilized State with strong ties to 
Western States and their traditions, (2) both civilized States and 
culturally Western States uniformly believe the death penalty should 
not be applied in certain situations, (3) the consistently held beliefs of 
these States should be instructive to the United States' own view of 
the death penalty in these situations. This line of reasoning recognizes 
that one source of information on objective reality is the beliefs of 
other, similarly-situated States. Put simply, the Court reasons: "They 
are like us and they don't apply the death penalty, we might infer 
from this that there is something uncivil about its application." 
Domestic belief is not changed because of specific information 
regarding the particular harms of the death penalty (for instance, if 
empirical evidence demonstrated that the existence of the death 
penalty increased the likelihood of homicide because criminals 
believed they had no incentive to refrain from egregious violence). 
Rather, belief may be changed because of inferences drawn from 
others' changed beliefs. This dynamic interplay between group 
members provides the basis for international norms to effect domestic 
norms. 
We have to this point identified the processes by which 
international regimes may expressly influence domestic law and 
behavior. International process and ratification can influence domestic 
regulation as well as market behavior through a number of different 
84. Id. at 576. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA. Res. 44/25, at 
161, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989). 
85. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577 (internal citations omitted). 
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mechanisms. Where process produces information, that information 
may influence preference and in turn perceptions of the subjective 
norm. Ratification in certain conditions may have similar effects. For 
instance, ratification can also carry information on what behaviors 
others prefer or are willing to socially sanction. There are thus a wide 
variety of ways in which treaty-making and ratification can influence 
domestic processes. 
These processes do not work in a vacuum; context must also be 
considered. A number of factors may also increase or decrease the 
domestic effects of ratification. If a State develops domestic law to 
comply with a treaty's standards, that law may, in turn, have further 
expressive impact. Similarly, the pre-existing beliefs of the populous 
may significantly influence the domestic impact of international 
process. We have already discussed how preexisting belief may 
influence perceptions of objective reality. Preexisting belief may also 
affect beliefs about the subjective norm. If, for example, a State's 
citizens believed the State's leaders were ratifying a treaty only due to 
international pressure and in spite of public preference, ratification 
would likely have no effect on understanding of majority preference. 
In this way, each situation of international regulation presents its own 
unique set of factors to which the tools of expressive theory can be 
applied in order to determine their likely domestic affect. 
2. Indirect Influences on Normative Belief 
Indirect influences can also affect a State's normative belief 
and thereby change its actions. Individuals and entities without 
formal positions in the political sphere, such as persons with 
recognized moral status (e.g., an imprisoned Nelson Mandela),86 
celebrities from the entertainment world (for instance, French actress 
Brigitte Bardot, a strong advocate of animal rights),87 and media 
outlets,88 can impel States to honor their international obligations by 
influencing estimations of the likelihood of sanctions. Among indirect 
actors, non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") often play a key role 
m promoting international law observance by influencing the 
86. See NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM (Little, Brown & Co. 1994). Put 
another way, certain individuals who are representative of the moral point of view can influence 
the perceptions of what behaviors are preferred by "moral" nations. See infra note 118 
(describing the representativeness heuristic and its impact on norm perception). 
87. BARNETT SINGER, BRIGITTE BARDOT: A BIOGRAPHY (McFarland & Co. 2006). High 
visibility increases the availability of information on a particular point of view, thus serving to 
influence perceptions of others' preferences. See infra note 119 (describing the availability 
heuristic and its impact on norm perception). 
88. For a detailed description within one national context, see Benjamin L. Liebman, 
Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
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subjective norm. This is especially true in the context of human rights 
treaties.89 
A central function of NGOs is investigating international 
human rights violations and disseminating information on these 
abuses. NGO-issued human rights reports are usually framed against 
a State's previous ratification of one or more human rights 
conventions, and point to particular acts as violating those 
agreements.90 Hence, NGOs use the historical fact of a State's prior 
agreement to abide by international norms, and its present desire for 
esteem from other States also bound by those accords, to shame a non-
complying State into altering its conduct. 91 One commentator notes 
that this tactic is "particularly effective where a government is 
sensitive to international public opinion,"92 but this understates the 
point. It is precisely because States value esteem from the global 
community that they are compelled, through the need-reinforcement 
principle, to alter their actions and thereby avoid the disapprobation 
of their peers. NGOs are especially well placed to alter a State's 
normative belief because their main currency is disseminating 
information that can erode a State's global reputation. Bringing 
pressure to bear through negative publicity leverages non-complying 
States to alter their behavior and honor their international 
obligations.93 
To illustrate how an NGO can change a State's estimation of 
the subjective norm, consider the actions of Mental Disability Rights 
International ("MDRI"), an NGO promoting "international oversight" 
89. See generally NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 2005) 
(discussing different approaches that might create international accountability for non-State 
actors). Although we focus on NGOs in this Article, we note that the contributors to this 
collection correctly point out and explain the role of other non-State actors, for example 
multinational corporations and international agencies, in enforcing human rights regimes. 
90. The mandate of the global NGO Human Rights Watch, for example, includes 
documenting and reporting abuses that violate international instruments prohibiting torture 
and the subordination of women. An overview of that organization's activities is available at 
Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2006). 
91. "The pointed finger of shame ... has caused executions to be stayed, death sentences to 
be commuted, torture to be stopped, prison conditions to be ameliorated, prisoners to be released, 
and more attention to be paid to the fundamental rights of many citizens." David S. Weissbrodt, 
The Role of International Nongovernmental Organizations in the Implementation of Human 
Rights, 12 TEX. lNT'L L.J. 293, 298 (1977). 
92. Laurie S. Wiseberg, Protecting Human Rights Activists and NGOs: What More Can Be 
Done?, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 525, 531 (1991). 
93. See, e.g., Michael H. Posner & Candy Whittome, The Status of Human Rights NGOs, 25 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 269, 272 (1994) (noting that NGOs ''have helped to transform the 
debate from a restrained diplomatic discourse among governments to a more urgent and real 
confrontation of ongoing and serious human rights crises"). 
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on the human rights of persons with intellectual disabilities.94 Mter a 
two-year investigation, MDRI released a detailed report and press 
release of human rights abuses against mentally disabled children 
and adults in Hungary's national mental health system. 95 Among the 
findings of MDRI's investigators were that Hungarian children with 
disabilities were excluded from schools and placed for the rest of their 
lives in institutions; that adult residents of "social care" (i.e., nursing) 
homes, psychiatric institutions and general hospital psychiatric wards 
were subjected to lifelong inhuman and degrading treatment; and that 
among the "care" given to mentally disabled persons was being "placed 
into cages for unlimited time periods without supervision."96 MDRI 
asserted that these actions violated established human rights covered 
by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 97 the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 98 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 99 In response to 
the international negative publicity generated by MDRI's report, 100 
Hungary promulgated new disability rights legislation, and 
established a human rights ombudsman system to protect 
institutionalized persons.1o1 
Hungary's reconsideration of the human rights of persons with 
mental disabilities in state-run institutions following MDRI's 
allegations of human rights abuses fit neatly within the need-
reinforcement framework. At the time of MDRI's report, some eight 
years after its political emancipation from the former Soviet Union, 
94. An overview is provided in the organization's website, which is available at Mental 
Disability Rights International, http://www.mdri.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2006). What follows is 
drawn from press releases, human rights reports, and sources posted therein. 
95. MDRI's investigators visited and interviewed people in both institutional and "social 
care" (nursing home) settings. See ERIC ROSENTHAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL 
HEALTH: HUNGARY (1997), http://www.mdri.org/pdf/Hungary.pdf. 
96. Id. at 16-18. 
97. G.A. Res. 2200A, at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 19, 
1966). 
98. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
213 U.N.T.S. 222 (Sept. 3, 1953). 
99. G.A. Res. 2200A, at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 
1966). Curiously, MDRI might also have asserted violations of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, at 166, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. 
A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989), as well as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, at 197, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 
51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984). 
100. ln contrast, widespread publicity within Hungary had almost no effect. See Gabor 
Gombos et al., Hungary: The Social Care Home Report, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 361, 
363-69 (2002) (describing the pace of progress in Hungary's mental health care institutions 
following release of MDRI's report). 
101. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH: HUNGARY, supra note 95, at 6-7 (describing 
new disability rights legislation promulgated by Hungary). 
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Hungary aspired to join the Western community of States and sought 
their approbation. The report and the publicity it engendered 
produced reputational damage and esteem loss for Hungary from the 
United States and the European Union, which in turn caused 
Hungary to recant its policies and alter its behavior. In other words, 
as an NGO, MDRI indirectly affected Hungary's estimations of utility 
by changing that State's perception of the likelihood that failure to 
abide by an international norm would result in a loss of esteem in the 
eyes of other countries. In order to counter the effects of the release of 
this information, Hungary took action that remedied the esteem 
loss. 102 
III. CLARIFICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXPRESSIVE MODEL 
As we have just discussed, the expressive theory provides a 
detailed model of how international process affects the willingness of 
States to ratify and comply with treaties. One other strength of the 
theory is its ability to explain, at least in part, a number of issues 
where international law scholars either find themselves at odds with 
one another or where there is simply no reliable understanding of a 
particular State's action. These include providing a way of 
harmonizing divergent viewpoints on the ability of international 
regimes to construct the identities of States, whether the social force is 
different than traditionally understood forces of coercion and 
persuasion, how norms become internalized and what information 
signals may carry. This Part will apply expressive theory toward a 
better understanding of these and other issues. 
A. Harmonizing Rationalism and Constructivism 
Discussion of how international law affects behavior generally 
divides into two schools of thought: the rationalists, who emphasize 
military-economic power, and the constructivists, who focus on norms 
and global ideational structure. 103 The rationalist/constructivist divide 
also resonates within arguments regarding the primary means for 
achieving compliance among States. Accordingly, rationalists believe 
102. MDRl has followed similar strategies in other emerging countries seeking global 
esteem. See generally Eric Rosenthal, The Application of International Human Rights Law to 
Institutional Mental Disability Law, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 387 (2002) (transcript of 
remarks by Eric Rosenthal, MDRI's founder and executive director). For additional, country-
specific reports, see MDRI's website, supra note 94. 
103. Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra note 6, at 632-33; see also Koh, 
Internationalization, supra note 2, at 976 (discussing how the dialectic between those who take 
interests as a given and those who take them as constructed developed). 
110 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1:77 
that coercion is the force by which compliance Is created, while 
constructivists emphasize persuasion. 104 
The rationalist/constructionalist divide has served to straight-
jacket efforts to consider in depth the force of social processes on 
compliance. Lack of an independent model of how social forces work 
hampers discussion and design of international regimes. As Goodman 
and Jinks have observed, it is not that "international legal scholarship 
has completely failed to identify aspects" of how social forces affect 
state behavior. Rather, the mechanism by which this happens is 
"poorly understood ... and often conflated (or confused) with other 
constructivist mechanisms such as persuasion."105 Put simply, without 
a better understanding of how normative compliance forces operate, 
we cannot form an accurate account of how best to achieve compliance 
in any given situation. 106 The expressive theory provides substantial 
insights into this lacuna. By identifying the framework and 
microprocesses of normative influence, the expressive theory provides 
a means for discussing the differences between normative and other 
influences on State behavior. Further, the expressive theory suggests 
when the different mechanisms of change are most effective. 
Our expressive theory is primarily a rationalist understanding 
of normative behavior. It is based on the notion that rational States 
have preferences to be "esteemed members" of international society 
due to the increased benefits that come from cooperation. However, 
the expressive theory diverges from purely rational actor methodology 
in two significant ways. First, it does not concur with the rational 
actor determination that coercion is the force by which compliance is 
created. Second, because expressive theory draws on the desire for 
esteem rather than on coercion as the motivating factor, it also 
recognizes that international processes have constructive effects. 
Constructivists argue that interests are socially constructed by 
commonly held principles, identities, behavior norms, or shared terms 
104. Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra note 6, at 633-34; Koh, 
Internationalization, supra note 2, at 976. For a discussion of these two schools, their 
assumptions and limitations, see Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties, supra note 5, at 1944-
62. 
105. Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra note 6, at 626-27; see also Koh, 
Internationalization, supra note 2, at 980-81; Alvarez, supra note 7, at 970 (interpreting 
Goodman & Jinks's concept of acculturation). 
106. See also Dinah Shelton, Compliance with International Human Rights Soft Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 119, 131-32 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 
1997) (decrying adequate methodologies for adequately examining compliance); Beth A. 
Simmons, International Law and International Relations: Scholarship at the Intersection of 
Principles and Politics, 95 AM. Soc'¥ INT'L L. PROC. 271, 273-78 (2001) (lamenting the dearth and 
depth of interdisciplinary examinations of central issues, including compliance). 
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of discourse. 107 This constructivist school also shares ties to the 
English "international society" school because both believe that States 
obey international rules for reasons beyond mere calculations of how 
compliance or noncompliance will affect their interests. 108 They believe 
instead that State decisions are influenced by the pull of international 
society, itself a force that derives from States' long-term interests in 
the maintenance of international community.l09 
The need-reinforcement component of expressive theory 
provides the link between the constructivist and rationalist 
approaches. By harmonizing theories from these distinct schools of 
thought, it provides a more comprehensive framework for 
understanding and predicting State behavior. Need-reinforcement 
demonstrates how rational self-interest can lead to a separate desire 
(or preference) to maintain relations with other States. Like the 
rationalists, need-reinforcement describes the desire to be members of 
international society as a result of the benefits these States will 
receive through cooperation. This desire, however, exists separately 
from other preferences-it is a preference for esteem and not a 
preference for material or economic benefit-and can serve as a 
powerful influence on the willingness of States to conform to law. 
Similarly, the need-reinforcement principle provides a better 
understanding of groups and group discourse. As we have seen in our 
earlier discussion of need reinforcement, the key to social influence is 
that an individual identify with a particular group. Further, that 
group membership derives from cooperative benefit borne of frequent 
and long-term interaction. At some point, group membership attracts 
one to other members of the group generally. Over time, the group will 
develop commonly-held norms. Behaviors for which clearly developed 
norms do not exist, however, would be open to group "negotiation." 
We start our discussion of how interests are constructed with 
the premise that not all norms are clearly developed or entrenched. In 
many cases, States simply may not have perfect (or even accurate) 
107. See Koh, Why Do Nations, supra note 3, at 2633. 
108. I d. at 2634 ("The predominantly American constructivist school has close familial ties to 
the English 'international society' school of Grotian heritage."). Koh cites Andrew Hurrell, John 
Vincent, Barry Buzan, Gerritt Gong, Richard Little, and Michael Donelan as modern scholars 
who work in this vein. Id. at 2634 n.181. 
109. E.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, at 27-28; Martti Koskenniemi, The Pull of the 
Mainstream, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1947 (1990); John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: 
A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139 
(1996); see also Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological 
Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 219, 220-21 (1997) (advancing a psychologically based 
theory of compliance). 
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information on the preferences of others.l10 This normative 
misperception is often referred to as pluralistic ignorance, a condition 
in which nearly all members of a group believe that virtually all other 
group members support certain norms, even as these same individuals 
privately reject that behavior.l11 A renaissance of recent work in the 
field has demonstrated the phenomenon's existence in a wide variety 
of group contexts, 112 although the phenomenon has been understood 
for well over seventy years. 113 Although the reasons for the existence 
of pluralistic ignorance have not yet been fully developed, this wide-
ranging experimental work demonstrates that a number of factors, 
including lack of information and misinformation regarding other 
States' preferences, may lead to uncertainty regarding norms in a 
wide-variety of contexts. 114 
When norms are uncertain, the process of international law 
making can serve to construct normative beliefs. Let us consider an 
example that will help identify some of these constructive 
mechanisms. Assume five States, in geographic proximity to each 
other and with strong diplomatic and economic ties, are experiencing 
an influx of immigrants from nearby States. Assume further that the 
llO. See McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory, supra note 70, at 355-56 (describing the variety of 
ways in which individuals may lack perfect information on the approval patterns of others). 
111. Id. at 356-57. 
112. See generally David Hines et al., Pluralistic Ignorance and Health Risk Behaviors.- Do 
College Students Misperceive Social Approval for Risky Behaviors on Campus and in Media?, 32 
J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 2621, 2622 (2002) (stating that pluralistic ignorance is a pervasive 
feature of social life: "It has been found to characterize the dynamics of social situations ... 
social groups ... and social movements_ .. "). For specific discussions of pluralistic ignorance in a 
variety of groups see Cristina Bicchieri & Y oshitaka Fukui, The Great fllusion: Ignorance, 
Informational Cascades, and the Persistence of Unpopular Norms, in EXPERIENCE, REALITY, AND 
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 89, 93 (Maria Carla Galavotti & A. Pagnini eds., 1999) (citations 
omitted) (gang members and prison guards). 
113. For example, as far back as the 1930s Richard Schanck demonstrated how members of 
the Methodist Church in Elm Hollow were almost unanimous in outwardly supporting norms 
against card playing, drinking alcohol, and smoking while privately undertaking these 
behaviors. 
ll4. While a comprehensive understanding of pluralistic ignorance does not yet exist, those 
who study the phenomenon generally agree that it is based on a propensity of individuals to 
perceive their motivation for acting as different from others. See Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. 
Miller, Pluralistic Ignorance and Alcohol Use on Campus: Some Consequences of Misperceiving 
the Social Norm, 64 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 243, 244 (1993). In particular, social 
psychologists have demonstrated that an individual may understand his or her own actions to be 
normatively controlled but perceive others to act out of preference or true belief. See Hines et. al., 
supra note 112; see also Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller, Pluralistic Ignorance and the 
Perpetuation of Social Norms by Unwitting Actors, in 28 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 161, 162 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1996). For a discussion of the self/other difference and its 
sources, see Bicchieri & Fukui, supra note 112, at 97; see also Dale T. Miller & Deborah A. 
Prentice, Collective Errors and Errors About the Collective, 20 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 541, 544-45 (1994) (suggesting the bias is based on the cultural propensity to 
underestimate the power of social motives to influence behavior). 
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five States are considering whether to enter into an agreement that 
provides immigrants with certain basic rights (say, health care and 
other financially costly social benefits) and that, at this point, three of 
the five States generally disfavor providing rights to immigrants, and 
two are slightly in favor of doing so. 
During the process of negotiating an agreement, the parties 
will reveal their preferences more clearly. Mter a general discussion of 
the topic, an observer with good information would likely conclude 
that there exists a norm against providing rights to immigrants in this 
region, albeit a weak one. The negotiation, however, provides an 
opportunity for States to influence both the preferences and normative 
belief of others. A pro-treaty State may attempt to change other group 
members' perceptions of objective reality through the provision of 
information, for instance, by explaining how providing these rights 
will incentivize workers with technical skills to emigrate and fill a 
need in the workforce. The pro-treaty State may also attempt to 
change the reticent States' perceptions of the subjective norm. It may 
appeal to more broadly held norms such as "equality" or "fairness" as a 
means of either decreasing estimations of the likelihood of being 
sanctioned by the other States, or perhaps of attempting to convince 
other States that a pro-immigration norm exists within the group.l 15 
In a similar vein, the pro-treaty State may appeal to well 
established and more specific norms in the global community to which 
the five States belong. If the State can point to a generally held 
universal norm of fair treatment of immigrants, this too can influence 
expectations of social sanction. This latter point recognizes that 
normative influence can transcend the boundaries of the specific group 
of States that are negotiating the treaty. States identify themselves as 
members of more than one group. They may find the influence of 
certain States with whom they share strong bonds to be greater than 
others to whom they are more loosely connected because they evaluate 
the esteem from these different group members differently. Such loose 
connections, however, still exert some degree of normative force based 
on the desire for esteem from these other group members. In this 
sense, group identity plays a key role in the influence of normative 
belief, and the beliefs of all States with whom a State identifies 
become relevant to its analysis of the subjective norm. 116 
115. McAdams has descrihed such a phenomenon, explaining how certain specific behaviors 
may be made normative by connecting them to more universally held and generalized norms. 
McAdams, The Origin, supra note 66, at 383. 
116. In this way a large block of nations, for example, Western Democracies, may exert 
influence on matters between other group members to which they are not even part. See 
generally Diane M. Mackie & Sarah Queller, The Impact of Group Membership on Persuasion: 
Revisiting ''Who Says What to Whom with What Effect?," in ATTITUDES, BEHAVIOR, AND SOCIAL 
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Finally, a number of heuristics117 may further influence 
normative perception. States (as well as NGOs) may attempt to use 
States identified as representatives of the group to affect the norm 
estimations of other group members. 118 They may also attempt to 
make the information that supports their normative claims more 
available in order to skew norm perception.u9 If these forces change 
the intent of even one of the three reticent group members, then a 
tipping point is reached and a weak pro-treaty norm will be 
established. Expressive mechanisms that rely on self-identification, 
along with other efforts to make aggregate group preference more 
certain, can be used to influence the interests of rational States. 
Indeed, in the case of treaties that are dependent on the normative 
mechanism, this force will be the primary, if not the only, means by 
which international processes may proceed. This example makes clear 
that interests of others within the group or a different group with 
which the States identify can be used to affect the way interests are 
"constructed" through the commonly held principles, identities, 
behavioral norms and terms of discourse suggested by Koh. 
In sum, the expressive theory recognizes that interest theory 
and constructive theory can be squared. While States maintain 
preferences for the esteem of others, given uncertain and constantly 
changing normative belief, established interests rarely exist at the 
outset of international discussions. Rather, discussions between States 
play the role of influencing normative belief and, in turn, the interests 
of States. 
B. Distinguishing Persuasion, Reputation, and Coercion 
Failure to understand more clearly the differences between 
forces of coercion, persuasion and reputation hamper efforts at regime 
CONTEXT: THE ROLE OF NORMS AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP, supra note 29, at 135 (providing 
empirical evidence of and discussing the importance of approval from other group members). 
117. Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts that allow individuals to meaningfully process 
probabilistic information. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. men, Law and Behavioral 
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 
1127-34 (2000) (describing the effect of social norms on deviations from self-interest). 
118. The representativeness heuristic "refers to the tendency of actors to ignore base rates 
and overestimate the correlation between what something appears to be and what something 
actually is." Id. at 1086; see also Dale T. Miller et. al., Pluralistic Ignorance and Inconsistency 
Between Private Attitudes and Public Behavior, in ATTITUDES, BEHAVIOR AND SOCIAL CONTEXT: 
THE ROLE OF NORMS AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP, supra note 29, at 95, 103-12 (discussing the 
exaggerated normative influence of those who embody the norms of a particular group). 
119. Availability refers to the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of certain outcomes 
due to the fact that information regarding that outcome is more "vivid, well-publicized, or more 
prevalent among a particular actor's friends and acquaintances." Korobkin & men, supra note 
117, at 1087-88. 
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design and make identification of the most effective compliance tools 
unattainable. The expressive model provides a basic understanding of 
when a state is persuading, using reputational measures, or coercing 
compliance. While there is some overlap, the expressive model treats 
persuasion, reputation, and coercion as primarily distinct forces. 
Consider first the distinction between persuasiOn and 
reputation. According to the expressive model, persuasion occurs when 
an actor attempts to use information regarding objective reality to 
revise estimates of certainty or evaluation of non-normative 
preferences, while normative or reputational influence occurs when 
information on the subjective norm is communicated. Consider the 
beliefs of the State in Figures 7 and 8 regarding global warming. Over 
time, the science regarding global warming changes the State's 
estimation of the likelihood that seas will rise, destroying a portion of 
its coastline and inland areas, and increasing the number of cancers. 
At some point, the certainty of these harms increases, in turn 
changing a preference from non-compliance to compliance. This is true 
persuasion: the information changes the State's beliefs to the point 
that it now prefers to comply. As discussed above, persuasion also 
affects normative belief; thus, no act is purely persuasive. However, to 
the extent that information acts directly to influence beliefs about 
objective reality, it would be fair to characterize the normative 
influence of this behavior as an indirect-and thus secondary-
benefit. On the other hand, when efforts are focused directly on 
changing beliefs regarding the subjective norm, those efforts are 
primarily reputational. 
Now consider the difference between reputation and coercion. 
The key to this distinction is that reputation works on the subjective 
norm while coercion implicates preference for factors beyond the scope 
of the treaty. For example, specific aid money or restraint from the use 
of military force may be considered coercive because each operates on 
preferences that lie outside of a treaty regime. By contrast, 
reputational forces work by their appeal to the general benefit one 
derives from being a group member. 
Note that in this respect, coercion is not like persuasion in that 
the latter relates to the goals of the international regime and provides 
a means for explaining how the regime itself will further preference. 
Coercion recognizes that persuasive and reputational forces are not 
sufficient to create compliance. Rather, there are other benefits or 
detriments necessary to achieve compliance goals. In this sense, 
reputational forces exhibit the characteristics of both coercion and 
persuasion. They are coercive to the extent that they are outside the 
attitude of a State; they are persuasive because they reflect an 
existing preference for esteem. Reputational forces are distinct from 
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coercion and persuasion, however, in that they act on a particular 
preference-the preference for the esteem of other States. 
Another dividing point between coercion and persuasion is 
autonomy. In the event of coercion, a State's autonomy is violated 
because it is brought to comply with a position that it would otherwise 
oppose. Persuasion may likewise bring a State to heed a regime 
dynamic that under other circumstances it would resist, but the 
State's autonomy is maintained because it "voluntarily'' agreed to this 
otherwise undesired regime. In real world terms, these categories may 
devolve down to the proverbial stick and carrot, even if the end result 
looks much the same. 120 
C. Explaining Internalization 
The expressive model also helps us to understand exactly how 
the rules of a particular treaty become internalized. Many scholars 
recognize that voluntary obedience arising from internalization of a 
norm, rather than coerced compliance, is the preferred enforcement 
mechanism. 121 The question that remains, however, is how norms 
become internalized. To date, current understanding of internalization 
within international law scholarship has been limited.l22 Generally, 
internalization is equated with a dynamic process of identification, 
repetition and feedback. Harold Koh, for example, describes the 
process as starting with the identification of a norm as a result of an 
interaction between transnational actors. 123 Once the norm is 
announced, certain transnational actors seek to bind other States to 
120. In defining this taxonomy, we expressly reject purely existential notions of volition. For 
example, we disallow claims that poor women without employment prospects and in dire 
economic straights "voluntarily'' engaged in prostitution or other illegal activity. 
121. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, are emblematic of this assertion. For additional, and 
varied examples, see Robert C. Bird, Procedural Challenges to Environmental Regulation of 
Space Debris, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 635, 645-49 (2003) (discussing the promotion of cooperation 
rather than sanctions); George W. Downs et al., The Transformational Model of International 
Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 465, 468 (2000) 
(discussing how empirical evidence of horizontal cooperation "carrots" shows it as more 
efficacious than vertical coercive "sticks"); Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating 
in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1229, 1243-88 (2004) (providing a game theory model to demonstrate the proclivity of States to 
cooperate due to inter-connected relationships); Guzman, supra note 3, at 1849 (finding that 
States are motivated by cooperative gains). 
122. See Posner, supra note 13, at 824 (arguing that, while constructivist scholars rely 
heavily on the notion of internalization, they have yet to develop a theory of how internalization 
happens). 
123. See Koh, Why Do Nations, supra note 3, at 2646 (internal citations omitted) (describing 
three phases of processes of transnational actors). 
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"obey the [norm] as part of [their] internal value set."124 According to 
Koh: 
Such a transnational legal process is normative, dynamic, and constitutive. The 
transaction generates a legal rule, which will guide future transnational interactions 
between the parties; future transactions will further internalize those norms; and 
eventually, repeated participation in the process will help to reconstitute the interests 
and even the identities of the participants in the process.125 
This model, however, confuses compliance that results from a 
desire for esteem or from habit with the process of internalization. A 
simple thought experiment highlights the difference. Imagine a group 
of States with a well-entrenched norm that education is a primary 
basic human right. 126 Imagine further that one member of the group is 
an agricultural country with poor economic conditions, where the basic 
goal of State spending is subsistence and public health. Education is 
not accorded as high a preference in such a country, but it 
nevertheless feels pressure from the well-established norm to provide 
education to its populace. 
Now assume that the other group members have lost their 
ability to determine whether the agricultural State is providing 
education so that there are no more reputational effects tied to 
compliance. At some point, one would expect the practice of providing 
education to evolve and the preference of using resources to other ends 
to assert itself. 127 Long-term interaction with other States regarding 
the well-established norm has not resulted in that norm somehow 
permeating the consciousness of the agricultural State; internalization 
has not occurred. Rather, internalization occurs in circumstances 
where, if the normative factors are removed, a State still believes it is 
in its best interest to follow a particular behavior. 128 The State, in 
Koh's terms, obeys because of its own internal values. In that case, the 
State is no longer acting out of regard for external social sanctions 
(opprobrium by fellow States for not providing public education), but it 
is acting out of preference (because it has come to regard positively the 
provision of public education). Nor is it likely that simple repetition of 
a behavior (providing pubic education) will affect its internalization. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. As indeed, they have through the Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 
at 166, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989). 
127. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 117, at 1113-15 (noting that habits can be rational in 
the global sense but recognizing that past behavior does not affect the preference structure of an 
actor). 
128. See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 1603, 1626 n.51 (2000) (noting that internalization must be the result of changed 
preference); Geisinger, supra note 17, at 66 (arguing that internalization can only be equated 
with a preference change). 
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These beliefs are more likely to change due to changes in information 
about objective reality.l29 
This is not to imply that the process outlined by Koh does not 
influence behavior (or that his contributions to the field have been 
anything less than seminal). What we point out is that when these 
processes act, they do so through the mechanism of increasing norm 
certainty suggested by the expressive model, rather than 
internalization as suggested by Koh. Indeed, the above quotation 
provides wonderful insight into how complex interaction can construct 
and develop normative belief. But consider Koh's example in a new 
light; that is, let us re-write his appraisal in the context of the forces 
that impact normative belief. At the beginning of the process, the 
norm relevant to a situation is unknown or, at most, uncertain. 
Announcement of the norm begins the move toward increased 
certainty. As other States are guided by the norm, certainty that a 
particular behavior is norm-congruent increases, with a corresponding 
increase in the esteem a State would expect from acting in accordance 
with the norm. This leads more States to act in accordance with the 
norm. Over time, this norm cascade continues until a point where the 
norm becomes entrenched in the fabric of international society. 
This reinvention of Koh's intrepid insights helps clarify how 
State desire for esteem can be harnessed by international legal 
process. Legal process provides not just focal points for cooperation, 
but also an iterative process of norm development and entrenchment 
that carries with it strong influence on the behavior of States. 
D. Explaining Signaling 
The expressive theory also adds insights to discussions of how 
States may signal each other through treaty ratification and 
compliance. Signaling theory takes as its starting point the 
presumption that States communicate their cooperative nature to 
others by undertaking certain behaviors that reflect their willingness 
to forego immediate benefit for long-term gain.130 States that 
undertake the most expensive signals demonstrate their low discount 
rates; that is, they demonstrate the higher value they place on future 
129. There are a number of real-life examples of this phenomenon. Eastern European 
nations that were previously members of the Soviet Union, for example, now speak their native 
languages instead of Russian, and have also returned to their own native faiths and national 
identities. Much the same can be said for the situation in Northern Ireland. 
130. For a more complete discussion, see POSNER, supra note 46, at 18-22 (providing the 
foundational exegesis of signaling theory in law); Moore, supra note 8, at 883-85 (adapting 
Posner's theory to the context of human rights). 
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payoffs than States that don't undertake such behaviors.131 These low 
discount rates translate into those States being better cooperative 
partners because it is less likely that a state that values long-term 
gains will defect from cooperative relationships for short-term 
benefits. 132 
A signaling theory of international law proceeds to consider the 
types of signals that States create through ratification and compliance 
behavior. A variety of different equilibria resulting from signaling in 
the international context can develop. It has been suggested that, over 
time, state practice might be separated into four rough categories: 
acceding and complying States, acceding and noncomplying States, 
nonacceding and complying States, and nonacceding and 
noncomplying States. Those States that accede and comply, of course, 
demonstrate the lowest discount rate, while those who neither accede 
nor comply show the highest likelihood to defect from cooperative 
relationships. 133 
Signaling theory, however, remains incompletely understood. 
In particular, it suffers from certain limitations on the ability to 
describe how States "agree" what behaviors are signals and about the 
content of these signals. A signal is only worthwhile if members of the 
community understand what it means. Advocates of signaling theory 
recognize this limitation and the particular problems of developing 
shared meaning in an international society that is itself comprised of 
many different cultures.134 Should, for example, ratification be 
considered a signal? Should compliance? Should both? As a way of 
engaging this problem, it might be suggested that signaling is the 
result of "general perceptions of performance in an area rather than 
individual actions in individual cases."135 But this begs the question of 
"whose perception": for if meaning has to be shared, then how does 
subjective perception matter? It further begs the question of which 
general perceptions amount to signals, and which do not. 136 Such 
difficulty in identifying the behaviors and content of signals results in 
131. POSNER, supra note 46, at 17. 
132. ld. 
133. Moore, supra note 8, at 903. 
134. Jd. at 901-02 (internal citations omitted). While they cannot explain how the process 
happens, they rely generally on the fact that it is in nations' interests to agree on meaning so 
that signaling can take place. 
135. ld. at 896. 
136. See McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates, supra note 54, at 676 (arguing that the most 
efficient means of producing a reputation for a particular behavior is performing the behavior 
and that this reputational strategy will almost always overcome the signaling strategy, thus 
suggesting that few behaviors will be signals); see also Moore, supra note 8, at 896 (recognizing 
that if the costs of a signal are sufficiently low or the benefits sufficiently high then both states 
with high and low discount rates will signal). 
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a theory that is primarily descriptive. If a State's behaviors are 
perceived as cooperative then those behaviors are signals. If they are 
not perceived as cooperative then those behaviors are not signals. 
Expressive law provides a more complete basis for 
understanding just how behaviors carry information regarding 
cooperativeness. This mechanism is somewhat different than the 
signaling mechanism. As previously described, expressive theory 
explains that States seek the esteem of others because of the operation 
of a need-reinforcement mechanism that results in an attraction to 
others with whom a State shares cooperative benefits. States are thus 
interested in what other States prefer and do not prefer, and norms 
simply reflect the aggregate preferences of group members. Norm-
congruent behavior, in turn, signals ones' evaluation of group esteem. 
The more willing a State is to abide by less certain norms, the more it 
values group membership. Behavior does not thus carry information 
on discount rate but on the importance of group membership. A State 
that highly values esteem from the group is less likely to act in 
defiance of the group's norms. 
In sum, expressive theory generally supports the notion that 
States signal their nature to other States through certain behaviors. 
Expressive theory, however, suggests that States ratify and comply 
with treaties not to provide information on discount rate, but to, 
instead, signal their attraction to the group. While evaluation of group 
esteem provides the basis for understanding a State's cooperativeness, 
certainty of preference will provide a basis for determining whether 
ratification or compliance will act as a signal. That is, the more a 
group of States identifies a preference for particular behaviors 
associated with a treaty, the more certainty a member of the group 
has that the behaviors will receive esteem. 
E. Implications 
The expressive model provides a framework for considering 
both the decision to enter into a treaty regime, as well as the decision 
whether to comply with the regime afterwards. The model suggests 
that the pull of international society can exert significant influence on 
the willingness of States to enter into treaties. Moreover, while signals 
of compliance may be more ambiguous, and thus harder to 
understand, normative forces can also impact significantly the 
willingness to comply with these agreements. 
Let us begin with a discussion of the influence exerted by 
international norms on ratification. The force is two-fold. First, a State 
must consider the esteem benefit it receives from ratification. Second, 
it must consider the foregone disapprobation it will receive by not 
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ratifying. Recall the example of a newly formed Islamic democracy 
discussed above, and assume that it has two relevant preferences. 
That State wishes to increase its esteem with others, and it also has a 
general desire to not recognize or advance the particular rights being 
advanced by the CEDA W as far as providing the franchise to 
women. 137 In such a case we would assume that the State would not 
ratify the treaty. Indeed, under this model we expect a State only to 
enter into the CEDAW if (as posited above) the normative benefit 
outweighs the sum of all other costs. While normative pressures can 
be very substantial, the general notion that norms on their own can 
result in ratification of a significant number of treaties is certainly 
thrown into question by such an understanding. 
Now take into account the costs associated with not ratifying 
the CEDA W in terms of negative esteem. That is, by not joining the 
treaty regime, the newly democratic Islamic State will suffer esteem 
costs from failure to uphold the recognized international norm that 
favors women's equality while also gaining no other benefit. 138 Assume 
the amount of decreased esteem will roughly mirror the expected 
increase that would come from ratification. In such a case, in addition 
to foregoing the esteem benefit that would result from joining the 
treaty regime, that State undergoes esteem loss. Where this is true, 
the newly democratic Islamic State, despite its ex ante preferences, 
will be much more inclined to ratify the CEDAW. The picture painted 
by the expressive law model supports the general notion that 
normative influences can make rational States ratify treaties. Indeed, 
foregone reputationallosses may be responsible for some heavy lifting 
in terms of creating incentives to join treaty regimes. 
The theory further suggests that, to the extent the costs of 
making ambiguous the message sent by ratification are lower than the 
costs of complying with a treaty, a State will choose to do the former. 
Two major variables are relevant to the decision to ratify or comply for 
normative purposes: the effect of monitoring and the impact of 
137. We could, of course, model specific beliefs regarding undertaking the behaviors required 
by a treaty. For example, a treaty standard requiring accommodating disabled individuals may 
carry with it a large number of underlying beliefs. Such a standard will cost money to the 
government in the form of accommodations and will slow the economy by taking business 
resources and the disabled are not capable workers compared with the rest of the workforce. The 
leader of that nation will evaluate each of these beliefs and its certainty to reach an ultimate 
belief about the behavior. For the sake of simplicity, we present this more complex calculus in 
terms of ultimate belief. 
138. The negative reaction aimed at the United States for not supporting the Kyoto Protocol 
is another example of such disesteem. For an overview of the negotiation techniques and an 
evaluation of their likely success, see Jutta Brunnee, A Fine Balance: Facilitation and 
Enforcement in the Design of a Compliance Regime for the Kyoto Protocol, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 
223 (2000). 
122 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1:77 
resource limitations. An important variable and its effect on this key 
issue in current human rights scholarship is the effect of monitoring 
on decisions to enter treaties. Monitoring is the key to reputational 
enforcement. Under the expressive model, norms are endogenous; they 
reflect the preferences of other State members of a group. One follows 
such norms out of a desire for esteem (or to avoid disesteem). If a 
State could act contrary to the norm without surveillance, the State 
would receive no esteem or disesteem and thus would not be 
concerned regarding the normative consequences of its actions. 139 
The second major variable arises from the understanding that 
many States are not able to reach a treaty's goals due to financial or 
other limitations. As a result, many international treaties stipulate 
that States need only make progress that is reasonable in light of 
resources. 140 The existence of such a standard provides some basis for 
States to ambiguate the signal sent when human rights violations are 
found. They do so by recognizing that their behavior counters the 
norm and by expressing their concern, while also characterizing the 
behavior as previously unknown or fiscally unavoidable. In such a 
manner, the State maintains the status it receives through ratification 
and limits or completely neutralizes the disesteem it would otherwise 
receive for violating the norm. Because of the ability to make signals 
more ambiguous, one would expect States from whom progressive 
realization is required to feel less normative pressure to comply than 
to ratify. 
Let us return to an earlier example of the five States 
deliberating whether to ratify a treaty providing immigrants with 
basic social entitlements to consider the interaction of these forces on 
a decision based on regime structure. At one end of the continuum is a 
regime without monitoring, but one that contains clear standards on 
measuring reasonable implementation. In such a case, ratification 
would likely be universal. This is because even the low esteem benefit 
that arises from agreeing to the terms of an essentially aspirational 
regime will outweigh the costs needed to implement it. However, as 
discussed previously, compliance will likely also be minimal. At the 
139. This is similar to domestic examples of individuals who decry drinking, smoking, 
spousal ahuse, or the use of pornography in public, but feel free to undertake such behaviors 
behind closed doors. 
140. A seminal example is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 
1966). After setting out broad aspirations, the treaty mandates that "[e]ach State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant." Id. at Article 2. 
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other extreme is a regime that requires complete compliance with its 
terms through strong monitoring procedures. 
Assume for example that there are three different strategies 
available for providing immigrants with social rights. In ascending 
order of cost, these are the relatively low cost of requesting voluntary 
compliance with a rule empowering immigrants (inexpensive because 
it cannot be enforced), the moderate cost of providing health care and 
unemployment benefits to only those immigrants unable to sustain 
themselves (restrained, because most States will not allow these 
individuals entry in the first place), and the high cost of entitling 
immigrants to the same range of social benefits bestowed on all 
citizens (expensive due to the ratio of benefits provided to taxes paid). 
If a standard required implementation of the high cost strategy and 
failure to comply would almost certainly be discovered, the costs would 
be dramatically different. Certainty of esteem loss would be great and 
only those States for whom esteem benefits would outweigh the high 
costs of implementation would join the regime. For example, if the 
certain loss of esteem was less than compliance costs, that State would 
not join. One would expect such a regime to have high compliance but 
less universal ratification. 
Reality, of course, occ.urs somewhere in between these 
extremes. Human rights treaties often have substantial formal 
monitoring requirements that are set off by limitations on their 
enforcement in the form of behavior that will satisfy the treaty's 
standards or exempt a State from compliance. 141 Assuming the goal of 
the process would be to gain as much compliance from as many States 
as possible, we would suggest a regime design that balances all of 
these concerns. As a threshold matter, monitoring in all cases must be 
strong because without monitoring one would expect minimal 
compliance. The most effective regime design would provide for 
specific, individually negotiated benchmarks for each country.l42 
141. For normative analysis, see Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid 
Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 531 (2002); for examples, see citations infra 
note 151. 
142. A variation on this first model would be the use of framework conventions that allowed 
nations to agree to the general desirability of a goal with negotiated standards to occur at a later 
time. Such a regime may allow for the certainty of the norm to be established and increased as 
more nations commit to and implement it-building increased pressure on the esteem function of 
other nations that are later to commit. One example of this type of convention is the European 
Union's directive prohibiting employment discrimination, the Council of Europe Directive 
Establishing a Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation. Council 
Directive 2000/78, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 (EC). The European Union elected not to define 
"disability" on the ground that memher States would define the term within their particular 
legal and cultural contexts. This in turn creates an incentive for a definition that is believed not to 
violate the umbrella directive. See Lisa Waddington, Implementing the Disability Provisions of the 
Framework Employment Directive: Room for Exercising National Discretion, in DISABILlTY 
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Objectively verifiable standards, of course, would help increase the 
efficacy of monitoring. Such a regime would yield the largest number 
of ratifying States while also ensuring, to the extent possible, the 
highest standards of compliance for each country relevant to their 
desire for esteem. 
To synthesize our analysis we provide a model of how the above 
insights on treaty design and monitoring may affect the 
implementation of the forthcoming United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities. This treaty is expected to be 
adopted by the 61st General Assembly.l43 As of this writing, several 
provisions remain subject to negotiation, the most crucial of which 
focuses on the standards and mechanisms for implementing the 
treaty.l44 
To address the manner of the convention's implementation, a 
committee of National Human Rights Institutions ("NHRis" are quasi-
judicial bodies that implement human rights at the domestic level) 
submitted a draft proposal. 145 The NHRI submission contains 
innovative mechanisms directed at ensuring compliance. Most notable 
are the creation (in conjunction with disabled persons organizations) 
of baseline measurements and the drafting of individual national level 
action plans against which to assess progress, collective complaint 
mechanisms, and regional implementation.l46 Taken together, the 
proposed NHRI measures ensure transparent and efficient monitoring 
of the human rights of disabled persons. Although the adoption of all 
or part of this proposal is not guaranteed, its content is clearly 
illustrative of the reputational mechanism we model in this Article.l47 
RIGHTS IN EUROPE: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 107, 109 (Anna Lawson & Caroline Gooding eds., 
2005) ("EC directives set goals which Member States are obliged to achieve within a given 
period, but leave Member States free to select the most appropriate means of achieving those 
goals."). 
143. Information on the treaty is available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable. For an 
analysis by one of the participants, see Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). 
144. See Letter from the Chairman to all Members of the Committee (Oct. 7, 2005), available 
at http://www.un.org/esalsocdev/enable/rights/ahcchairletter7oct.htm. 
145. Towards An Innovative Monitoring Mechanism for the Convention: Submission on 
Behalf of National Human Rights Institutions to the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on a 
Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities (August 2005) [hereinafter NHRI Submission]; 
available at http://www.un.org/esalsocdev/enable/rights/documents/ihrcse.doc. 
146. Id. A conference was recently convened to discuss and refine the initial proposal. See 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2005/12/02_disabilities.php. 
147. Parenthetically, we note that current attempts at overhauling the United Nations 
treaty enforcement system are likewise harmonious with our framework. See The Secretary-
General, Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change: Report of the 
Secretary General: Corrigendum, U.N. Doc. A/57/387 (Oct. 16, 2002) (calling for measures aimed 
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The most effective way of using the pull of international society 
to leverage States into human rights compliance is through the 
creation of objectively-verifiable provisions that reflect realistic, 
realizable goals for each individual state member of the treaty 
regime. 148 The proposed NHRI model creates baseline measures and 
National Action Plans that are individual to every State party, and 
would be developed in conjunction with their administrative agencies, 
judiciaries, National Human Rights Institutions, and involved 
stakeholders (mainly, disabled persons organizations).149 
Consequently, the monitoring of a disability human rights convention 
would be transparent: a treaty body would measure a State's progress 
against the baselines and aspirations that a State had agreed-upon. 
Claims that a state could not realize such individually tailored goals 
will be less credible given the process by which the goals were created. 
Moreover, the use of regional assessments provides added incentive 
for a given State to comply with the convention to at least a level 
equal to that of its geo-political neighbors.l50 In sum, this form of 
monitoring puts into place documents that enable the questioning and 
enforcement of a State's commitment by specifically delineating the 
progress that must be achieved to maintain that State's reputational 
benefit. Even if that State argues that economic circumstances have 
changed since ratification such that compliance has been made more 
difficult, this system still constitutes a vast improvement over the 
laudable but vague aspirations contained in current treaties. 
Having provided a model of how expressive forces can best be 
used for achieving ratification and compliance, let us now turn to one 
or two further implications of the theory before providing our example 
of how the theory will be operationalized. One of the major 
implications of expressive theory for international law hinges on the 
important notion that group identity and attraction matters. There 
are at least two observations that flow from this understanding. First, 
for human rights treaties to succeed fully, States must be involved in 
other meaningful cooperative relationships. Without trade and other 
interaction, States will not develop the attraction to the group that 
at increasing coordination among monitoring bodies, greater standardization of reporting 
requirements, and additional monitoring at the national level). 
148. This is a commonly held assertion. See, e.g., George H. Aldrich, Compliance with the 
Law: Problems and Prospects, in EFFECTING COMPLIANCE 162 (Hazel Fox & Michael Meyer eds. 
2000) (transparent monitoring mechanisms necessary to effectuate regime compliance); 
Christopher C. Joyner, Sanctions, Compliance, and International Law: Reflections on the United 
Nations' Experience Against Iraq, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 37-46 (1991) (positing that only an effective 
enforcement mechanism can alter regime behavior). 
149. See NHRI Submission, supra note 145. 
150. Id. 
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results from the operation of the need-reinforcement principle. In this 
sense, strategies to protect human rights must be drawn much more 
broadly than simply within the context of human rights institutions. 
Aggressive pursuit of cooperation with States must be considered a 
part of any effective human rights protection scheme, at least to the 
extent such a scheme relies on normative forces for its success. 
Second, failure to identify with a group can lead States to 
esteem behaviors that are contrary to international norms. The rebel 
phenomenon is well known. Rebels identify not with the main group 
but with a group of "outsiders;" indeed, rebels in some measure define 
their identities by the amount they contravene established norms. 
Accordingly, rebels smoke, drive quickly and recklessly, or ride their 
motorcycles without helmets to flaunt the norms of the majority. 
States that act as rebels get esteem from a group other than the 
majority and thus get utility from not following a norm. International 
lawmakers must be wary of this phenomenon and factor it into their 
regime design. Creating broad, well-designed regimes will positively 
impact in-group members but will spur decreased compliance from 
self-defined rebels. In its broadest sense, this idea parallels the 
argument above that the most effective course for compliance is 
building group allegiance, but it is important to recognize that regimes 
are not universal. Thus, a true measure of a treaty's effectiveness will 
not simply be the compliance it engenders within the group but also 
the decreased compliance of those outside the regime. 
F. Making Human Rights Treaties Matter 
In an influential article, Oona Hathaway analyzes substantial 
empirical data and concludes that, in certain cases, States entering 
human rights treaties actually increase their violations of treaty 
standards after joining.151 Hathaway's conclusion raises concerns 
about the efficacy of human rights treaties specifically, and also 
throws into relief general concerns regarding the ability of social 
forces to influence compliance. 
Hathaway provides an explanation for these results that is 
grounded in expressive theory. She suggests that States behave in this 
manner in order to receive the reputational benefit that comes from 
joining treaty regimes without having to bear related compliance 
costs. Both Hathaway's empirical methodology and her theoretical 
model have been criticized. 152 Some commentators, for example, take 
issue with Hathaway's reliance on observed abuses. They note that, 
151. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties, supra note 5, at 1940. 
152. See citations supra note 6. 
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because monitoring increases once a treaty has been ratified, the 
number of observed treaty violations will also increase, in which case 
ratification correlates with greater knowledge of existing abuses 
rather than with greater abuses. 153 A core assumption of her theory-
that failure to comply does not carry reputational effects-also raises 
expressive law concerns. Hathway's critics argue that reputational 
benefits decrease as a State is revealed to be out of compliance with 
treaty terms. Thus, they point out that, a claim that reputational 
factors can create incentives to enter into a human rights treaty 
without also intending to comply with its mandates, is misplaced. 154 
The lack of a full theory of expressive international law, 
however, has rendered impracticable further discussion of this 
reputational explanation. Without a comprehensive theory one cannot 
begin to consider whether Hathaway's empirical findings are simply 
incorrect or, if they are correct, whether they reflect poor treaty design 
or the inability of social forces to influence the behavior of States. Our 
expressive theory picks up this challenge and provides insights into 
Hathaway's arguments. It agrees that, if monitoring is as low or non-
existent as she claims, many States motivated by reputation will 
ratify treaties without complying afterwards. It also provides an 
understanding of when the backsliding Hathaway identifies may 
occur. Ultimately, the expressive theory provides reasons for 
questioning Hathaway's empiricism. It also clearly suggests that, to 
the extent existing treaties are not effective, this shortcoming is the 
result of their ineffective design, and not proof that social forces 
cannot influence State behavior. 
Hathaway's expressive explanation of her data can be 
described by syllogism. First, she argues, States ratify treaties for 
expressive purposes that function like a roll call vote in Congress. As 
she explains it, ratification is a "pleasing statement not necessarily 
intended to have any real effect on outcomes. It declares to the world 
that the principles outlined in the treaty are consistent with the 
ratifying government's commitment to human rights."155 Second, she 
argues that when monitoring and enforcement are minimal, a 
disjuncture may arise between the expressive and instrumental roles 
of treaties.156 Hathaway concludes that in instances of disjuncture, 
153. Goodman & Jinks, Measuring the Effects, supra note 6, at 174· 76 (stating that 
Hathaway's model cannot distinguish between a State in which levels of torture increase post 
ratification and a State in which torture declines post ratification but appears to increase 
because liberalization eases the process of documenting and reporting instances of torture). 
154. Id. at 179-80 (describing the paradox that to be meaningful the signal must be costly yet 
at the same time States will choose to ratify if the ratification signal is relatively costless). 
155. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties, supra note 5, at 2005-06. 
156. Id. at 2006. 
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treaties' expressive aspects can "relieve pressure for real change in 
performance in countries that ratify the treaty," because these 
instruments "offer rewards for positions rather than for effects."157 A 
corollary to this main argument flows from her observation that 
regional treaties are more likely to create conditions for backsliding 
than universal ones. She concludes that this dynamic results from 
even greater pressure for States to join treaties when those treaties 
concern other States with whom they share strong regional ties. 158 
Our theory suggests that Hathaway's analysis may be right in 
very specific situations where States are certain that failure to comply 
will be of no consequence, and a strong international norm existed 
before a treaty regime developed. Consider, for example, a State before 
the creation of a treaty limiting torture of prisoners. Assume that 
before the treaty, a well-known norm exists against this practice. 
Concerns for esteem would lead the State to signal by behaving a 
certain way-in this case, not torturing prisoners. Treaty ratification, 
however, may serve to replace actual behavior as a way of signaling 
commitment to international society. When that circumstance occurs, 
the need to act to signal is decreased, and one would expect a State to 
adjust its behavior accordingly. 
Hathaway's theory works, however, only in cases where a State 
can act in derogation of a treaty without serious consequence to its 
reputation. For example, in situations where the State can plausibly 
argue that it is progressively addressing the treaty's stated goals or 
where its acts will not be discovered. In these circumstances, the 
benefits of esteem received from ratification must be balanced against 
the loss that comes from compliance failure. Where the net loss 
between these two is greater than the esteem received before entering 
into the treaty, the State will backslide. Note, however, how quickly 
the reputational effects assert themselves when monitoring cannot be 
discounted or where the standards in the treaty create objective and 
empirically verifiable standards of conduct through domestic action 
plans. In that case, failure to abide by the treaty not only carries 
reputational impacts because the State cannot as easily ambiguate the 
message carried by its behavior, but now the State will also be seen as 
violating another (more global) norm-the norm of respecting and 
keeping one's obligations. In such cases, it is highly unlikely that 
backsliding would occur. 
Expressive theory thus explains that backsliding may occur in 
certain cases. We take issue with Hathaway, however, over how 
prevalent such situations are, and we disagree with her to the extent 
157. Id. at 2007 (internal citations omitted). 
158. Id. at 2016. 
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that she claims failure to comply with most treaties would have little 
or no reputational effect. In particular, we agree with Hathaway that 
self-monitoring by States of their own compliance with human rights 
treaties leaves much to be desired.159 We disagree, however, with her 
exclusive focus on "woefully inadequate" State-driven compliance 
mechanisms when examining the crucial issue of monitoring. In 
pointing out this inadequacy, Hathaway concludes that "the failure of 
a country to comply with its treaty obligations is, in most cases, 
unlikely to be revealed and examined except by already overtaxed 
NGOs."160 Yet it is precisely NGOs, even when over-taxed, that exist 
to identify and report human rights violations. Moreover, the 
dissemination of this information, and the reputational affects that it 
conveys, leverage States to alter their behavior in order to avoid losing 
the esteem of the global community_161 
Our expressive theory provides robust support for this 
understanding. Every behavior provides a signal to the extent a State 
will infer the group commitment of the signaling State from it. While 
signals of group commitment communicated through compliance can 
be ambiguated, the notion that failure to comply carries with it little 
or no reputational effect is seriously circumspect. We would, in 
particular, take issue with claims that all or most States can plausibly 
deny their commitment to treaties over a period of time. This is 
especially true in relation to the previously discussed notion of 
progressive realization. As States develop economically over time, the 
ability to explain away a consistent level of non-compliance becomes 
more difficult. One would thus expect that developing nations would 
decrease their violations over time, and that developed nations would 
be unable to explain away many violations. In consequence, further 
inquiry needs to be made both into Hathaway's empirical 
methodology, and into its normative implications. 
159. Hathaway argues that this type of monitoring is "woefully inadequate." Id. at 2008. See 
also PETER UVIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT 140 (2004) (finding that monitoring 
processes "constitute some of the most powerless, under-funded, formulaic, and politically 
manipulated institutions of the United Nations"). We note, parenthetically, that the current 
United Nations treaty monitoring system is undergoing reform. 
160. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties, supra note 5, at 2008 (internal citations 
omitted). 
161. Moreover, the United States State Department also compiles information on national 
human rights that it publishes annually. An electronic archive of Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices compiled prior to 2001 is available at http://www.state.gov/www/globall 
human_rightslhrp_reports_mainhp.html. The irony, then, of Hathaway's claims is that although 
she describes the difficulty of gathering information on human rights compliance she herself has 
gathered the information in a manner that allows her to measure compliance in a detailed and 
complex manner. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article provides an initial and comprehensive 
understanding of the forces behind human rights treaty creation and 
compliance by drawing on evolving expressive law literature. It began 
by setting forth a model that explained how normative pressure 
influences rational actors to alter their behavior and beliefs while 
seeking regard from other group members. Next, the Article applied 
the model to State treaty ratification and compliance, and argued that 
the powerful pull of international society creates a rational choice for 
States to abide by these instruments because of their desire to be part 
of, and esteemed by, the global community. It demonstrated how 
international process influenced States' preferences and normative 
beliefs, which in turn affected their willingness to ratify and comply 
with treaties. The Article also demonstrated how expressive theory 
harmonizes the valuable (but incomplete) contributions of divergent 
international law scholars into a more comprehensive theory of why 
States enter into and honor international agreements. In doing so, it 
presented a detailed framework from which predictable 
determinations can be drawn. Finally, the expressive framework was 
used to describe the means for harnessing the "pull of international 
society" in the specific context of a disability human rights treaty that 
one of the authors is drafting and which will soon be presented to the 
United Nations General Assembly. 
Identifying how the desire for esteem from the global 
community motivates States to comply with international law has 
eluded scholars since the time of Grotius. The current debate among 
international legal scholars focuses on the efficacy of a reputational 
mechanism to impel State compliance with human rights treaties. The 
resulting literature is an important body of work that recognizes the 
centrality and implications of esteem-based mechanisms on 
compliance, but fails to provide a level of detail necessary to 
understand or predict how the desire for esteem affects the behavior of 
States. This Article has addressed that lacuna by presenting a 
comprehensive and detailed expressive law framework. In doing so, it 
provided an avenue for continued (and more focused) discussion and 
debate over how the desire for esteem influences States to enter into and 
comply with human rights treaties. 
It is imperative that we understand the impact that the pull of 
international society exerts over State behavior. The United Nations 
is currently undergoing a systematic reassessment, with special 
emphasis on the structure and efficacy of its treaty system. Dramatic 
changes are being proposed, including the combination of all existing 
treaty commissions (including the proposed disability-related one) into 
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a single super-treaty monitoring body. The final (structural) 
configuration of the United Nations treaty system, however, is less 
significant for influencing human rights compliance and regime 
change than is the efficacy of its monitoring processes. Transparent 
and efficient implementation of individually crafted and objectively 
verifiable standards must be created if States' need for international 
esteem is to be leveraged towards human rights treaty ratification and 
compliance. Expressive principles supply the means to harness the 
pull of international society and make treaty ratification and 
compliance effective. 
